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THE ROLE OF HISTORY AND CULTURE IN 
DEVELOPING BANKRUPTCY AND 
INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS: THE PERILS OF 
LEGAL TRANSPLANTATION 
Nathalie Martin*
Abstract: In this Article, Professor Nathalie Martin examines societal 
attitudes toward debt and ªnancial failure in the context of two global 
trends, the liberalization of bankruptcy and insolvency laws, and the 
increased availability of consumer credit around the world. The Article 
begins with a description of the history of the U.S. economy, its risk-
oriented capitalist ethos, its consumer culture, and its resulting consumer 
and business bankruptcy laws. The Article next brieºy addresses the 
personal bankruptcy systems of Continental Europe, noting that in some 
places, U.S.-style bankruptcy systems have been enacted but not necessarily 
accepted. Professor Martin then discusses Japanese and Chinese cultural 
attitudes toward debt, and brieºy discusses new laws being proposed or 
passed in Japan, Hong Kong, and mainland China, some of which are 
based in part upon U.S. laws. Based on this and other examples, she 
concludes that cultural attitudes play a tremendous role in the efªcacy of 
bankruptcy and insolvency systems. She further concludes that, as more 
and more consumer and business credit becomes available around the 
world, the countries affected will need to enact effective and accepted 
discharge and fresh start principles, but that these systems cannot simply 
be transplanted from the United States. Such transplantation is likely to be 
ineffective and thus gradual education and changes in laws and credit 
availability will be needed in order to avoid the extensive social costs that 
could result from too much credit in systems that do not accept ªnancial 
failure. 
Introduction 
 Does culture shape law or does law shape culture? Throughout 
history, culture has taken the leading role by informing society of 
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what laws are necessary and appropriate.1 Today, however, global eco-
nomics are rapidly changing the world, and credit—particularly con-
sumer credit—is being offered in greater amounts and to greater 
numbers of people in more countries than ever before.2 Commercial 
borrowing is also on the rise. One question raised by these increases 
in debt is whether there will be sufªcient safety nets in place to help 
people and entities that are unable to pay back all this new debt. 
 Many governments with developing economies are aware of the 
need for more forgiving insolvency systems, and are implementing such 
systems.3 In most cases, however, these new proposed systems do not 
arise from existing cultural conditions. Rather, the laws are trans-
planted from elsewhere and the cultural views are expected to change 
with the laws. Many new bankruptcy laws have been transplanted from 
the United States, which has a very different cultural attitude toward 
debt forgiveness.4 Although these imported systems have been 
strangely out of place in other societies, the transplantation continues.5 
This Article raises the question of whether these attempts at transplan-
                                                                                                                      
1 See Linz Audain, Critical Cultural Law and Economics, The Culture of Deindividualization, 
The Paradox of Blackness, 70 Ind. L. J. 709, 713–14 (1995) (discussing generally how culture 
informs law and economics and vice versa); Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 Yale J.L. & 
Human. 35, 37 (2001) (describing law as culture). 
2 See generally European Credit Research Institute, Consumer Credit in the 
European Union 16–18, available at http://www.ecri.be/pubs/ECR1en.pdf (Feb. 2000) 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2004) (noting tremendous increases in credit card debt in Europe); 
Paul Mizen, Consumer Credit and Outstanding Debt in Europe 1, available at http:// 
www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/ExCEM/issues/issues4.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2004) 
(exploring regional differences in the amount of outstanding debt in Europe); Jason 
Booth, KIS Investors Bet on South Korea’s Rising Debt, Wall St. J., May 30, 2002, at C14 (dis-
cussing the U.S. and South Korean levels of credit card debt and predicting a consumer-
credit blowout in South Korea that could slow the entire economy); Ian Fletcher, Card 
Fraud Soars to £228M, Evening Standard, Oct. 16, 2002, at 15 (noting mounting credit 
card debt throughout the United Kingdom, Mexico, and Malaysia, as well as China, South 
Korea, and Thailand); Growth of Credit Cards in Emerging Markets Leading to Concern Over 
Mounting Consumer Debt and Card Fraud, M2 Presswire, October 15, 2002, at 2002 WL 
26804947 (describing skyrocketing credit card debts in China, South Korea, Brazil, and 
Thailand). 
3 See Rafeal Efrat, Global Trends in Personal Bankruptcy, 76 Am. Bankr. L.J. 81, 91–92 
(2002). 
4 See Julia M. Metzger & Samuel L. Bufford, Exporting United States Bankruptcy Law: The 
Hungarian Experience, 21 Cal. Bankr. J. 153, 153 (1993) (noting how other countries are 
looking to the United States for an example of a working bankruptcy system). Article 9 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code is also being examined by other countries. See Daniel E. 
Allen, Personal Property Security Interests in Australia, A Long, Long Trail A-Winding, 106 Dick. 
L. Rev. 145, 147 (2001) (discussing how New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and even Eng-
land, are looking to Article 9 of the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code to solve a few nagging 
problems with personal property security systems in their own countries’ laws). 
5 See infra notes 392–414 and accompanying text. 
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tation are likely to create the desired results of fueling a market econ-
omy and promoting economic growth and well-being. 
 The current U.S. bankruptcy system grew directly out of the 
United States’ unique capitalist system,6 which rewards entrepreneuri-
alism as well as extensive consumer spending.7 It makes sense that a 
society in which dollars rule would have a forgiving personal bank-
ruptcy system in order to keep consumer spending high, and an 
equally forgiving business reorganization system to encourage risk tak-
ing and economic growth.8 Both systems are part of a larger scheme to 
keep economic players alive and active in the game of capitalism. U.S. 
bankruptcy systems are among the country’s few social programs and 
they address many of society’s ills.9 Thus, they are broad and form an 
integral part of the social system from which they sprung.10
 As globalization takes place, more and more countries believe that 
creating a viable bankruptcy system will help fuel a market economy.11 
                                                                                                                      
6 As one U.S. scholar recently noted: 
[E]ach country gets the bankruptcy law it deserves. I think we deserve 
[C]hapter 11. Bankruptcy does not exist independent of the social system 
that exists in each nation. The United States has little in the way of govern-
ment sponsored programs to compensate people for the dislocation caused 
by ªnancial failure. So every ªnancial problem, and that is not hyperbole, I 
think that’s almost true, every consequence of every ªnancial problem is 
thrown into our bankruptcy system: environmental problems, mass tort prob-
lems, business failure problems, failure of companies properly to fund their 
retirement plans. Whatever the reason for ªnancial failure, the only place we 
have to put it is bankruptcy. 
Richard F. Broude et al., The Judge’s Role in Insolvency Proceedings: Views from the Bench: Views 
from the Bar, 10 Amer. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 511, 522 (2002) (comments of Richard 
Broude). 
7 See Alan Reder, The Yoga of Money, Yoga J., Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 114 (discussing the im-
portance of spending in the U.S. economy). Indeed, after September 11, 2001, President 
Bush’s frequent pleas to consumers to spend caused one author to call this the “shop-till-
Osama-drops” plan for ªghting terrorism. See id.; see also Mark Gongloff, When Will We 
Spend Again?, Money.Cnn.Com, at http://money.cnn.com/2001/10/26/economy/econ 
omy_consumer/ (Oct. 26, 2001) (linking consumer spending to U.S. economic recovery). 
8 See infra notes 153–201 and accompanying text. 
9 See generally Broude et al., supra note 6; see also Karen Gross, Failure and Forgive-
ness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System 93–98 (1997) (describing the incredible 
emotional beneªts of bankruptcy, which in turn beneªt the economy as well as the per-
son’s well-being). 
10 See Edward J. Balleisen, Navigating Failure: Bankruptcy and Commercial So-
ciety in Antebellum America 28 (2001). In the United States, we do not draw large 
distinctions between our forgiving “rescue” culture for businesses on the one hand, and 
for individuals on the other. Philosophically, every person is a potential entrepreneur. 
11 See, e.g., Letter from Tarrin Nimmanahaeminda, Minister of Finance, & M.R. Chatu 
Mongol Sonakul, Governor, Bank of Thailand, to Michel Camdessus, Managing Director, 
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As a result, many countries have attempted to create a reorganization 
scheme for failing enterprises like Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code (Chapter 11), in which existing management stays in place and 
manages the reorganizing company.12 These systems are perhaps the 
most common U.S. legal exports today.13 Many countries are also liber-
alizing their consumer bankruptcy systems.14 Because consumer credit 
has become much more available in Western Europe and Japan, as well 
as parts of the developing world, more forgiving bankruptcy systems are 
a necessity.15 They cannot be imported wholesale, however. 
 Insolvency systems profoundly reºect the legal, historical, political, 
and cultural context of the countries that have developed them. Thus, 
even countries that share a common legal tradition, such as the United 
States, England, Canada, and Australia, display marked differences in 
how they approach both business and personal bankruptcies.16 Coun-
tries with different legal traditions, such as those within Continental 
Europe and Japan, currently have even more divergent bankruptcy sys-
tems, though many are moving toward the U.S. models.17
 Given the vast cultural differences around the world, and the his-
tory of each country’s economy and attitudes about money and debt, 
there is no one-kind-ªts-all bankruptcy system for enterprises or indi-
                                                                                                                      
IMF (Aug. 25, 1998), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/082598.htm (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2004) (assenting to the IMF’s demand for a reorganization plan as a pre-
requisite to bail-out assistance for Thailand during the Asian banking crisis). 
12 See Jeffrey Davis, Bankruptcy, Banking, Free Trade, and Canada’s Refusal to Modernize Its 
Business Rescue Laws, 26 Tex. Int’l L. J. 253, 253–54 (1991). The rationale is that providing 
for rescue opportunities creates additional beneªts to society not available in a liquidation-
only system, such as greater return for unsecured creditors, an ability for equity holders to 
retain an interest in a viable company, saving jobs, allowing suppliers to survive, and allow-
ing customers to continue receiving goods and services that may be in short supply. See id. 
Liquidation, conversely, can cause a domino of failure, unnecessarily harming everyone 
with whom the debtor does business. See id. 
13 See infra notes 268–308 and accompanying text. 
14 See Jason J. Kilborn, The Innovative German Approach to Consumer Debt Relief: Revolu-
tionary Changes in the German Law, and Surprising Lessons for the United States, 24 N.W. J. Int’l 
L. & Bus. 257, 257 (2003) [hereinafter German Approach]; Jason J. Kilborn, La Responsabili-
sation de l’Economie: What the U.S. Can Learn from the New French Law on Consumer Overindebt-
edness, 26 Mich. J. Int’l L. (forthcoming) [hereinafter French Law on Consumer Overindebt-
edness]; see also Efrat, supra note 3, at 91–92. Some countries, such as Italy and Greece, still 
have no personal bankruptcy system at all. See infra notes 241–267 and accompanying text. 
15 See Rafael Efrat, The Rise and Fall of Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study of Individual 
Bankruptcy Petitioners in Israel, 7 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 163, 165–66 (discussing the need for 
a forgiving bankruptcy system once credit has been deregulated). 
16 See Nathalie Martin, Common-Law Bankruptcy Systems: Similarities and Differences, 11 
Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 367, 403–10 (2003). 
17 See infra notes 235–308 and 380–414 and accompanying text. 
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viduals.18 New insolvency systems must instead reºect how individual 
nations have experienced the growth of market economies, and how, 
philosophically, countries have viewed debt. Bankruptcy systems are 
social tools. As such, they are value-laden and must be drafted with 
care to reºect the particular values of a culture. Yet the extensive 
availability of credit requires a face-saving way out of ªnancial failure. 
Providing such a way out is a challenge many nations will face as 
credit is used more extensively in the new modern economy. This Ar-
ticle attempts to aid this transition in some small way, by helping in-
form the decisions made within developing systems. 
 Part II of this Article explains the symbiotic relationship between 
capitalism and bankruptcy laws, the theories behind these laws, and 
the history and political systems upon which they are based.19 This 
Section also describes modern credit practices and attitudes toward 
debt and repayment.20 It then brieºy describes the U.S. bankruptcy 
systems that developed out of this economic history.21
 Part III discusses divergent attitudes toward debt in other parts of 
the world, using England, parts of Continental Europe, and parts of 
East Asia as examples.22 While many of these countries and regions 
have imported U.S.-style bankruptcy laws to some extent, all have far 
less forgiving cultural views toward debt and debt forgiveness than 
does the United States.23 Given these pronounced differences in atti-
tude, this Section concludes that the mere import of U.S.-style reor-
ganization and personal debt forgiveness systems is unlikely to create 
the desired economic effect.24
                                                                                                                      
18 A country should not simply reproduce Chapter 11, with its emphasis on the enter-
prise, the shareholders, and the creditors, in societies that place more value on employees 
and government debt than on payments to private creditors. Nor can one expect a society 
that deeply values a person’s word, and his or her honor, to readily accept the personal bank-
ruptcy discharge, even if doing so would fuel an economy based on consumer spending. 
19 See infra notes 30–106 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 107–149 and accompanying text. This Section discusses empirical re-
search regarding the types of debts that U.S. citizens have, as well as the circumstances 
many individual debtors face, when they ªle for bankruptcy. It brieºy examines business or 
corporate debt culture in the United States as well, concluding that there is little stigma 
associated with business failure in the United States, given the premium U.S. citizens place 
on entrepreneurialism and risk taking. 
21 See infra notes 150–160 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 209–228 and accompanying text. This Article does not do a true 
comparison of different systems, though a recent book describes many consumer systems 
around the world and compares some of these systems as well. See Consumer Bankruptcy 
in Global Perspective ( Johanna Niemi-Kiesiläinen et al., eds., 2003). 
23 See infra notes 209–228 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 511–513 and accompanying text. 
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 Part IV describes the global trend toward credit proliferation and 
concludes that countries must carefully examine cultural views and 
attitudes before allowing credit to spin out of control in their coun-
tries.25 If it is too late, and credit is already widely available despite 
very negative stigma toward failure, this Section advocates large-scale 
education efforts in order to keep people from becoming indigent, or 
even suicidal, following mounting debt.26 This Section ultimately con-
cludes that while importing a more forgiving bankruptcy system may 
help stem these problems, without changes in cultural attitudes, these 
new laws may have little impact.27
I. Bankruptcy in the United States: History,  
Attitudes, and Law 
 This Section outlines the history of the United States’ growth 
economy and the unique entrepreneurial spirit that led to an equally 
unique bankruptcy system for both businesses and consumers.28 It 
also discusses the development of consumer and credit culture and 
the laws that have developed from these unique quirks of history.29
A. The History of the U.S. Economy: The Connection Between Bankruptcy 
Law and Capitalism 
 Relatively speaking, U.S. society can be characterized as capitalis-
tic and consumeristic, although the extent to which the United States 
should embrace these two ideologues has been controversial 
throughout our history.30 Early discussions of bankruptcy policy were 
divisive, in part because early bankruptcy policy helped to shape the 
U.S. economic identity.31 The expansion of capitalism and spending 
resulted in some failure, followed by the creation of the ªrst U.S. 
                                                                                                                      
25 See infra notes 514–523 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 514–523 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 514–523 and accompanying text. 
28 One of the goals of this Section is to explain to foreign scholars who are studying 
the U.S. insolvency systems how the U.S. system came into being and how it fuels U.S. capi-
talism and entrepreneurialism. 
29 See infra notes 107–201 and accompanying text. 
30 See Richard C. Sauer, Bankruptcy Law and the Maturing of American Capitalism, 55 
Ohio St. L.J. 291, 291–98 (1994). 
31 See id. at 298. 
2005] The Role of History & Culture in Bankruptcy & Inslovency Systems 7 
bankruptcy system.32 This Section reviews the economic culture from 
which this bankruptcy system arose.33
1. The Development of the United States’ Free-Market Economy. 
 Alex de Tocqueville’s “new model man” portrayed the American 
as a child of the commercial revolution that should progress quickly 
toward commercial and industrial maturity.34 This model saw eco-
nomic prosperity, technical development, education, and expanded 
cultural opportunities as the lynchpins of a successful society.35 On 
the other hand, the agricultural sector of society rejected these big-
business ideas as a threat to its ideal nation of small producers and 
laborers who earned an honest living working the soil.36 The agrarian 
sector saw the new merchant and ªnancial capitalists as: 
parasites who drop their buckets into wells dug by others. . . . 
Unbounded by any connection to honest labor, their proªts 
could accrue to such a level as to enable the capitalist sector 
to upset the delicate counterpoise of interests that sustain a 
free and virtuous social order, and substitute a morally vacu-
ous dynamic of market transactions and proªt calculations 
that respects the social identity of neither person nor prop-
erty.37
In this context, the battle over appropriate bankruptcy laws began. The 
market capitalists saw the development of a credit-based economy as 
                                                                                                                      
32 See id. 
33 This Article does not outline the history of U.S. bankruptcy laws, as this has been 
done well and extensively outlined by previous scholars. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The His-
torical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 Am. Bankr. L. J. 325, 344–69 (1991) [herein-
after Tabb, Evolution of Discharge]; Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in 
the United States, 3 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 5, 7 (1995) [hereinafter Tabb, History of Bank-
ruptcy]. 
34 Sauer, supra note 30, at 291–92. 
35 See id. at 292. 
36 See id. at 292–93. These were the Jeffersonian Republicans, who later became De-
mocratic Republicans, and then ªnally, modern-day Democrats. See David A. Skeel, Jr., 
Debt’s Dominion 26 (2001). 
37 Sauer, supra note 30, at 293. As Sauer notes, this view was not limited to purely 
southern agrarians. For instance, Benjamin Franklin wrote, “the only honest Way; wherein 
Man receives a real Increase of the Seed thrown into the Ground, in a kind of continual 
Miracle wrought by the Hand of God . . . as a Reward for his innocent Life and virtuous 
Industry.” Benjamin Franklin, Positions to Be Examined, in 16 Franklin Papers 107, 109 
(William Willcox ed., 1972). Thus, Franklin’s sentiments illustrate that upon this nation’s 
formation, mercantile capitalism (with its venture capitalists) was not an idea embraced 
immediately. See id. 
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absolutely essential.38 Conversely, the agrarian sector of society saw ex-
tensive credit as a vice.39 The more a person wished to create a free-mar 
ket capitalist economy, the more he supported the free availability of 
credit, as well as a systematic means of dealing with ªnancial failure.40
 By the early 1800s capitalist interests began to win out over agrar-
ian interests, and a greater number of agrarians began producing food 
for sale rather than mere consumption.41 Artisans in turn moved away 
from customized markets and toward standardized goods for a larger 
market. More and more U.S. citizens entered business as merchants of 
one form or another.42 Burgeoning market-oriented production and 
surging demand for food and consumer goods fostered great economic 
growth. In the decades following the War of 1812, U.S. citizens pro-
duced more cotton, grain, livestock, textile goods, coal, and lumber 
than previously thought possible.43 A greater number of U.S. citizens 
began, at last, to have disposable income to spend on house wares, 
nicer homes, fancier furnishing and clothing, and unimproved land. 
 The expansion of the United States’ market economy, however, 
depended heavily upon “the credit system”- an intricate tangle of ob-
ligations that extended throughout the country’s ªnancing, produc-
tion, distribution, and consumption.44 The United States saw itself as 
a land of great potential, and was thus taken by optimism and a will-
ingness to build and spend far beyond its actual wealth.45 Thus, the 
antebellum economy was structured as much around borrowed 
money and promises to pay, as it was around rivers, roads, and ca-
nals.46
                                                                                                                      
38 See Sauer, supra note 30, at 293–94. 
39 See id. at 294–95. These were the Federalists, who later became the Whigs, who then 
became modern-day Republicans. See Skeel, supra note 36, at 26. 
40 See Sauer, supra note 30, at 295. Much of this view was predicated on the intangibility 
of credit. See id. That is, as a primarily agrarian economy, where trade and commerce ex-
isted as a real exchange of goods, credit allowed one party to the transaction to cheat by 
receiving something for nothing. See id. In a sense, the idea of credit as a vice to these 
agrarians makes perfect sense as their time-frame within each commercial transaction was 
as limited as the perishability of the items they sold. Thus, selling on credit a perishable 
item that could never be repossessed likely inºuenced this view. 
41 See Balleisen, supra note 10, at 26. 
42 Id. at 26–27. 
43 See id. at 27. 
44 Id. 
45 See id. 
46 Balleisen, supra note 10, at 27. 
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 Few merchants could enter business without credit.47 Entrepre-
neurs rarely paid rent, wages, supplies, or transportation costs in ad-
vance, nor did they demand cash from their own customers.48 A study 
of the court records of debtors who ªled for bankruptcy under the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1841 shows that the use of credit was common by 
the mid-1800s.49 Indeed, many merchants not only paid debts many 
months after they were incurred, but also allowed their own custom-
ers to pay them under even slower payment schedules.50 Needless to 
say, this does not make particular business sense, but the free market 
economy was new and many wanted to participate.51
 The availability of credit was seen as central to reaching eco-
nomic potential in a capitalist system.52 In fact, one scholar called “sys-
temized credit” the one characteristic of capitalism that distinguishes 
it from all other economic orders and, as the Albany Republican 
Committee noted in 1837, “the credit system has extended our com-
merce all over the world—peopled our wilderness—built our cities 
and villages—founded our colleges and built our schools. It has given 
us national wealth and individual prosperity.”53 In short, credit was in 
large part what deªned capitalism as well as wealth.54
                                                                                                                      
47 See id. at 26–27. As Balleisen notes, this dependence on credit was based in part on 
the development of the United States’ post-revolution brand of market capitalism. Id. 
48 Id. at 28 (describing how merchants rarely expected to be paid upon delivery, either 
for agricultural products or ªnished articles). 
49 See id. at 27–28. Balleisen spent several years in the Northeast branch of the National 
Archives in Bayonne, and later, when it relocated to Manhattan, examining federal bank-
ruptcy records following the passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1841. Balleisen found that as 
many as one in three businesses had succumbed to ªling for bankruptcy as of the 1840s 
and 1850s. Id. at 3. He found that the availability of credit was far greater than many had 
anticipated. Id. at 27–29. One of his underlying theses is that the integration of a national 
credit system helped contribute to a new phase of capitalism in the United States. See id. at 
27. The average U.S. citizen could now start up a business on credit and attempt to attain 
his or her dreams. Of course, the business cycle, economic blights, and large debt burdens 
forced many to ªle. See id. at 32–41. 
50 See id. at 28–32. 
51 See Balleisen, supra note 10, at 53. Balleisen quotes an article from a defunct New 
York magazine from the time, which read “All classes became smitten with a sudden crimi-
nal passion of being rich . . . . They thought no more of the gradual accumulation of 
wealth by labor, but would escape the curse imposed on Adam. A fortune must now be 
made in a day.” Rural Tales and Sketches of Long Island: The Kushow Property, 12 Knicker-
bocker 190 (1838). 
52 See Sauer, supra note 30, at 294–95 (discussing how the availability of credit has long 
been central to developing a capitalist economy); see also Forest McDonald & Ellen 
Shapiro McDonald, Requiem: Variations on Eighteenth-Century Themes 184 (1988); 
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations 275–77 (Knopf 1991). 
53 See Balleisen, supra note 10, at 32. The quote comes from a July 22, 1837 article in 
NWR, Address of the Albany General Republican Committee.” Credit is the universal solvent of a 
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2. The Rationale and Political Milieu of Early U.S. Bankruptcy Law 
 While credit was seen as necessary, it also had its hazards. Where 
there is credit, there is also default, and the use of credit unques-
tionably made early U.S. citizens vulnerable to the shifting currents of 
the overall economy, and intricately tied them to the ªnancial health 
of the ªrms with which they did business.55 This may explain why 
many early market capitalists in the United States favored a systematic 
and forgiving bankruptcy system to address the issue of default.56 
Ironically, a system of distributing a debtor’s available assets and dis-
charging his or her remaining debts was ultimately seen as a charac-
teristic of economic modernity, “the result of the complex develop-
ment to which modern society has attained.”57
 People took risks, and the bankruptcy system facilitated this risk 
by design. The drive to be self-employed, and thus to be successful in 
business, caused a great deal of ªnancial failure in the mid-1800s.58 
The economy was friendly to any capitalist effort, as the goal was to 
create a vibrant market economy as quickly as possible.59 As young 
men tried their luck at business, many learned about success, as well 
as failure, in the pursuit.60 Interestingly, early bankruptcy merchants 
included women as well as men, indicating that women participated 
in the marketplace even as early as the 1700s.61
                                                                                                                      
market economy. It increases the liquidity of assets and allows extensive investment, even 
from geographically remote locations. 
54 “[Credit] is a kind of mercantile funding system, which enables [merchants] to 
enlarge their capital by anticipating the proªts of their enterprises.” 38 Annals of Con-
gress 1098 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Wood). 
55 See Balleisen, supra note 10, at 31. 
56 See Sauer, supra note 30, at 295–96. But see Balleisen, supra note 10, at 26–27. Thus, 
the division between agrarians and capitalists, and that between bankruptcy advocates and 
those against it, was predicated on a recognition of the potential for failure and the need 
to address such failure. 
57 Sauer, supra note 30, at 296 & n.28. 
58 Balleisen, supra note 10, at 15. The desire to go into business, despite inexperience 
and limited capital, made many early entrepreneurs vulnerable to ªnancial failure. See id. 
59 See id. 
60 See id. at 18. 
61 See Karen Gross et al., Ladies in Red: Learning from America’s First Female Bankrupts, 40 
Am. J. Legal Hist. 1, 3–4 (1996). The stories of the women told in this article prove that 
women of the 18th and 19th centuries were indeed engaged in the commercial market-
place and the world of debt and credit. Some had children and some did not, and most 
were engaged in business of some sort. See id. at 16–18. Like the men, some failed, but in a 
sense this is evidence of their success. Id. at 36. They too were willing to take risks. See id. 
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 A legal culture of tolerance toward non-payment developed, in 
order to encourage people to continue entrepreneurial pursuits.62 
The relative lenience of U.S. bankruptcy law, as compared to law on 
the European continent, for example, shocked some, including Alex 
de Toqueville, who commented on the “strange indulgence” shown to 
bankrupts in the United States.63 He claimed that in this respect, “the 
Americans differ, not only from the nations of Europe, but from all 
the commercial nations of our time.”64
                                                                                                                      
62 See Balleisen, supra note 10, at 16. Of course, this is just one side of the story, and 
the rosy one at that. See Bruce H. Mann, Republic of Debtors: Bankruptcy in the Age 
of American Independence 79 (2002) (chronicling the history, development, and ulti-
mate abolition of debtors’ prisons in the United States, which originally were permitted in 
every state). 
63 See Balleisen, supra note 10, at 13. 
64 Id. at 13. Tolerance toward bankruptcy debtors was seen as a signiªcant contributor 
to successful capitalism, as volatility in the free market was a fact of life. See id. at 18; see also 
Sauer, supra note 30, at 295. As during ªnancial panics and depressions, bankruptcy 
helped problems percolate slowly through the system. More importantly, endemic insol-
vency and the ability of bankrupts to gain legal absolution from old debts “unleashed a 
range of economic energies.” As Balleisen explains: 
Perhaps the most important connections between antebellum bankruptcy 
and the release of capitalist energy manifested themselves in post-failure ca-
reer strategies. Not every former bankrupt sought a haven from risk after in-
solvency. Discharge from past obligations encouraged a number of highºiers 
to redouble their entrepreneurial efforts. These bankrupts typically sought to 
breech prevailing commercial boundaries, either by expanding the domain of 
market transactions, developing new products, or devising new methods of 
distribution. On occasion such efforts produced spectacular postfailure suc-
cess; more commonly they led only to new accumulations of unpayable obli-
gations. Collectively, the ventures of risk-taking former bankrupts helped to 
consolidate a business culture predicated on “creative destruction,” in which 
a multitude of entrepreneurs mounted ongoing assaults on prevailing forms 
of economic activity, at once seeking proªts and envisioning, if not always re-
alizing, a continuous process of social “improvement.” 
Balleisen, supra note 10, at 19. A lenience toward debtors helped ordinary people create 
a market economy in the United States, and also caused some to rethink their role in the 
capitalist economy and thus to engage in valuable “capitalist adaptation.” Id. at 21. 
Thus, bankruptcy’s historical popularity with the commercial classes is attributable to 
its ability to promote and foster commercial development in several ways. First, having an 
involuntary bankruptcy system in place makes it more efªcient to collect and distribute 
assets and also serves a deterrent function of causing people to pay debts rather than lose 
assets. See Sauer, supra note 30, at 299. Both involuntary and voluntary bankruptcy save the 
costs of ªghting among creditors and prevents state law collection efforts from eviscerating 
the debtor’s estate before it can be efªciently distributed. Preference laws, which require 
that creditors who received advantageous payments or property just prior to a bankruptcy 
to return it, discourage creditors from trying to gain such advantage while a debtor is in-
solvent. See id. Finally, by allowing a debtor to discharge most debts as long as he or she is 
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 The U.S. system also developed from the country’s distinctive par-
tisan political system, and the unique way that both debtor and creditor 
interests were balanced in that system, along with the early and promi-
nent role of attorneys as the primary professionals in its development.65 
In his account of the role of politics in the developing U.S. bankruptcy 
law, bankruptcy historian David Skeel explains that once creditor 
groups formed trade organizations that promoted the passage of a fed-
eral bankruptcy law, populist interests joined forces as well, forcing a 
compromise between debtor and creditor groups not seen in England 
or elsewhere.66 Because Republicans tended to favor creditor interests, 
and Democrats or Populists tended to favor debtor interests, the com-
promises that resulted were the product of the unique, U.S. two-party 
system.67
 Moreover, from the start, private attorneys played a very signiªcant 
role in U.S. bankruptcy cases and in the reform process.68 As the law 
took shape, general practitioners began to specialize in bankruptcy 
cases, thereby perpetuating the system.69 As Professor Skeel recounts, 
“government agencies have a tendency to become self-perpetuating. 
Once Congress establishes a new agency and creates jobs for a group of 
new government ofªcials, these same ofªcials will later serve as the 
primary bulwark against elimination of the agency. In a sense, the 
agency becomes its own political constituency.”70 As Skeel explains, 
while the bankruptcy bar is private rather than governmentally-run, it 
                                                                                                                      
honest and cooperative, the debtor has every incentive to be honest and helpful and not 
hide assets. See id. at 300. 
Other more obvious ªnancial beneªts ºow from a well-developed bankruptcy system 
as well. By limiting the ªnancial exposure of individuals, risk-taking is encouraged and the 
economy can grow. See id. Finally, and perhaps most obviously, by allowing an individual to 
discharge debts that are a burden, he or she can return to economic life, hire employees 
or be an employee, pay taxes, buy things, and otherwise fuel the economy. Such a system 
can keep that person “in play,” rather than leaving him or her economically dormant, im-
prisoned, and with a family supported by the state. See id. 
This Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the precursor to the current U.S. system and the ªrst 
systematic bankruptcy system of the nation. See id. The history surrounding its enactment 
explains in some measure how the complex U.S. bankruptcy system developed so much 
earlier than all other systems of its kind around the world. See id. at 300–01. 
65 See Skeel, supra note 36, at 2–4. 
66 Id. at 2. 
67 Id. at 16. 
68 See id. at 2. 
69 See id. at 92. 
70 Skeel, supra note 36, at 47. 
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has played an analogous, self-perpetuating role.71 This is one explana-
tion for why the system changes, but never by leaps and bounds. 
 Thus, a number of unique characteristics have created the U.S. 
bankruptcy system. These characteristics include a strong societal de-
sire to create a commercial economy, a resulting extensive use of 
credit, a desire to balance creditor and debtor interests in developing 
the law, a unique two-party political system that helped create this bal-
ance, as well as a highly unusual and prominent role for private attor-
neys in the bankruptcy process. 
3. The Rise in U.S. Consumerism 
 The above discussion focuses primarily on the development of 
business and commerce and the resulting business debt. Current U.S. 
attitudes toward personal or consumer bankruptcy, however, devel-
oped far more recently, under circumstances no less unique. The 
United States was pulled out of the Great Depression by World War II, 
which created jobs for virtually everyone who was not in the armed 
forces.72 Due to rationing of most consumer products, and stopped 
production for others, most people saved their wages.73 After the war, 
the United States experienced a period of inºation, after which con-
sumer demand for various household goods and services increased 
dramatically.74 Three things fueled these increases in demand: a pent-
up desire for things that were unavailable during the war, large sav-
ings accounts, and the baby boom.75
 U.S. policy at the time promoted spending to the fullest extent 
possible. As one consultant announced shortly after the war, “the great-
est challenge facing American business was convincing consumers that 
the hedonistic approach to life is a moral, not an immoral one.”76 This 
strategy apparently worked well, as Americans began purchasing to be 
happy, and building social experiences around the act of acquiring.77
                                                                                                                      
71 See id. 
72 See John Henry Schlegel, Law and Economic Change in the Short Twentieth Cen-
tury 15 (unpublished manuscript, on ªle with author). 
73 Id. 
74 See id. at 18. 
75 See id. 
76 David Ray Papke, Discharge as Denouement: Appreciating the Storytelling of Appellate Opin-
ions, in Narrative and the Legal Discourse 206, 214 (Papke ed., 1991) (quoting D. 
Miller & M. Nowak, The Fifties: The Way We Really Were 117 (1977)). 
77 See id. 
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 As inºation subsided, the housing and auto industries expanded 
and the United States began exporting a huge variety of goods, in-
cluding farm products. This resulted in large trade surpluses since 
Europe and Japan, the main U.S. trade partners, had little to export.78 
The economy grew in a strong and stable fashion in the early 1950s.79 
Capital was plentiful, and consumer goods appeared everywhere in 
record numbers. Chains like Sears and Montgomery Ward sold prod-
ucts cheaply, and more and more household electronic goods were 
being manufactured.80
 U.S. citizens with ready cash on hand began to believe that they 
needed these gadgets, that they were a sign of modernity and prosper-
ity, and that buying them would fuel the economy. Thus, a consumer 
class was born. 
 Since then, though the U.S. economy has sagged at various times, 
U.S. wages have made domestic production uncompetitive in many 
industries and thus upset trade balances.81 Still, consumer credit has 
been rising steadily for decades.82 Over time the United States has 
learned to consume too well. While it can manufacture and produce 
many products and services worthy of export, the voracious U.S. de-
sire to consume makes it unlikely that Americans will ever produce as 
much as they use.83 As a culture, Americans love to spend, and are 
even encouraged to do so when the economy ºags, despite record 
household credit and record low savings rates. 
4. The Effect of Low Down Payment Home Loans on Consumer 
Spending Habits 
 Another historical event that drastically changed the debtor-
creditor system in the United States was the home ownership pro-
                                                                                                                      
78 See Schlegel, supra note 72, at 18. 
79 Id. 
80 See id. at 19. 
81 See generally Matthew J. Slaughter, Multinational Firms and Wages in a 
Global Economy, available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~glm/pdf/SageMJS.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2004) (noting that low-skill labor wages in the United States are much 
higher than similar skill labor wages elsewhere, and therefore, ªrms have a clear incentive 
to move those operations abroad which utilize low-skill labor). 
82 See Series Title: Household Sector: Total Credit Market Debt Owed by: Credit Market Debt Out-
standing: Billions of Dollars: Amounts Outstanding End of Period, NSA, at http://www.economagic. 
com/em-cgi/data.exe/frbz1/º154102005 (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). 
83 See Bureau of Economic Analysis, Real Gross Domestic Product and Related 
Measures: Percent Change from Preceding Period, tbl.1(2), available at http://www. 
bea.doc.gov/bea/newsrel/2003cr.xls. (last visited Nov. 29, 2004). 
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gram introduced by President Roosevelt in the New Deal Legisla-
tion.84 Before 1930, home loans had short terms and were used pri-
marily by the wealthy, because one was required to put down 50% of 
the purchase price in order to get a home loan.85 As a result of these 
conditions, only about 45% of the homes in the United States were 
owner-occupied.86 Roosevelt sought to foster stability and security 
during the depression by making it much easier for the average per-
son to buy and keep a home.87
 This was accomplished through the formation of the Home 
Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), the Federal Housing Admini-
stration (FHA), and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The 
FHA, created by the National Housing Act of 1934, did not make 
mortgage loans but rather insured them.88 Because the FHA began 
insuring these loans, lenders were much more willing to make loans 
with lower down payments and at lower interest rates.89 This made 
mortgage loans more available to the middle class than ever be-
fore.90 Owning a home became a nearly universal dream for U.S. 
citizens after World War II.91 As late as 1940, half of all young adults 
between the ages of twenty and twenty-four lived with their par-
ents.92 In the ªfteen years following the war, home ownership shot 
                                                                                                                      
84 U.S. Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (codiªed as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
 1437(2000)). 
85 Thomas W. Hanchett, The Other “Subsidized Housing:” Federal Aid to Suburbanization, 
1940–1960s in From Tenaments to Taylor Homes 165 ( John I. Bauman et al. eds., 2000). 
86 Id. 
87 Florence Wagman Roisman, Teaching About Inequality, Race, and Property, 46 St. Louis 
U. L.J. 665, 676 (2002). Perhaps I should say that this legislation made it easier for the 
average white person to buy and keep a home. Numerous scholars have noted that at the 
same time that the FHA and VA reduced down payments under these programs, minorities 
were refused such loans and instead lived in stingy, alienating public housing projects, 
which hindered minority home ownership for the rest of this country’s history. See id. 
88 See National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73–479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codiªed as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1750 (2000)). 
89 David Dante Troutt, Ghettos Made Easy: The Metamarket/Antimarket Dichotomy and the 
Legal Challenges of the Inner-City Economic Development, 35 Harv. C.R.-C.L. Rev. 427, 439 n.46 
(2002) (stating that the FHA’s new lending model allowed for smaller down payments, 
lower interest rates, longer repayment periods, and full loan amortization, making it easier 
for many homeowners to buy rather than rent). 
90 See id. Troutt notes that between 1936 and 1941, new home owners increased from 
332,000 to 619,000. See id. 
91 See In the Good Old Days: Fact or Fiction on the Nostalgia Trip, available at 
http://www.agls.uidaho.edu/ccc/CCC%20Families/pdf/coontz.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 
2004). 
92 The Feminine Mystique, at http://www.columbia.edu/~rr91/3567_lectures/feminine_ 
mystique.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2004). 
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up to 62%.93 No one individual was more responsible for this change 
than William Levitt,94 who built new Cape Cod homes and sold them 
for $7,990 in the late 1940s, with little or no money down and a 
4.5% interest rate.95
 These events forever changed the face of U.S. consumerism and 
consumer credit. They ultimately revolutionized the home ªnance 
industry in three ways: by making 20% down payments the norm, 
rather than the previous 50% required;96 by stretching home loans 
out over twenty-ªve or thirty years, as compared to the three years at 
which commercial banks were lending; and ªnally, by amortizing the 
loans rather than having them end with balloon payments.97 As a re-
sult of these and other more recent changes, 68.6% of U.S. citizens 
now own their homes,98 a percentage higher than most other coun-
                                                                                                                      
93 Id. 
94 Id. William Levitt became: 
the Henry Ford of home building by applying methods of mass production to 
housing. In the late forties, William Levitt embarked on the biggest private 
housing project in American history. Buying up 4,000 acres of potato ªelds in 
Hempstead, Long island, about 25 miles east of New York City, he started 
work on 17,500 homes in what was to be known as Levittown. To minimize 
costs, he broke down construction into 26 steps. Teams of workers executed 
speciªc tasks: bulldozing the land, paving the roads, pouring foundations, 
planting trees, joining the walls and roof, installing the plumbing and elec-
tricity, and painting. Every house was identical, one story high, covering 25 by 
32 feet, with a living room, kitchen, two bedrooms and a bathroom. . . . 
 Those cape cod houses became the single most powerful symbol of the 
dream of upward mobility and home ownership for American families. With 
no down payment, a 30-year mortgage, and a tax deduction for interest pay-
ments, it was cheaper to buy a house in Levittown, where mortgage costs ran 
$56 per month, than to rent an apartment in New York, where apartment 
rentals averaged $93 per month. 
Id. 
95 E-mail from Polly Dwyer, President of Levittown Historical Society, to Frederick 
Hart, Professor Emeritus of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law ( Jan. 11, 2003; 
01:20:40 MST) (on ªle with author); see also John Cassidy, The Next Crash: Is the Housing 
Market a Bubble That’s About to Burst?, The New Yorker, Nov. 11, 2002, at 123 (discussing 
the Levittown development project). 
96 See Marc A. Weiss, The Rise of the Community Builders: The American Real 
Estate Industry and Urban Land Planning 32 (1987). 
97 See Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Sub-urbanization of the 
United States 204 (1985). 
98 U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancy Survey First Quarter of 2004, available 
at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/q104tab5.html (last visited Nov. 8, 
2004); see Coastal Business, Sun-News (Myrtle Beach, S.C.), Apr. 6, 2002, at D1 (reporting a 
67.8% home ownership rate in April of 2002, and noting that the Great Plains and the 
Great Lakes region had a rate of 73.9% and 72.7% respectively but that the Paciªc Coast 
had a rate of just 59.6%, showing a large variation across the country). 
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tries in the world.99 The New Deal Legislation unquestionably led to 
this result and, along with the advent of private mortgage insurance, 
now allows U.S. citizens to buy a home with 0% down.100 These condi-
tions lead to a generally higher disposable income for U.S. citizens 
than most other citizens in the world.101
 Low down payment loans in the United States have led to another 
uniquely U.S. phenomenon, the home equity loan. Home equity loan 
indebtedness has substantially increased in a short period of time, from 
$60 billion in 1981 to $357 billion in 1991.102 These types of loans are 
pushed non-stop through the media in the United States, yet are virtu-
ally unheard of in Europe.103 In fact, European concepts of land own-
ership are completely different from U.S. concepts. The ownership of 
land and tenant rights in England had their origin in the feudal system 
imposed by William I with far more land owned publicly and far more 
people owning homes and businesses on leased land. 104 Thus, in com-
parison to the United States, there are far fewer home equity loans in 
Europe and the rest of the world and thus less overall indebtedness.105
                                                                                                                      
99 New Zealanders purportedly have the highest home ownership rate at 71.2% with 
Australia in second place at 70.1%. See Australia Has World’s Second Highest Home Ownership 
Rate, Asia Pulse, Feb. 11, 2002. The United States is next at 67%, see Coastal Business, supra 
note 98, at D1, and England is next at 66%. See Roger Bootle, Not a Common European Home 
Economic Agenda, The Sunday Telegraph (London), Aug. 18, 2002. Continental Europe’s 
rate is currently 58%, but, of course, this number represents an average of a number of 
different rates across Europe. See id. 
100 See, e.g., “0” Down, at http://www.newloan4you.com/0_down/0d1.html (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2004). 
101 In many parts of Europe, a buyer seeking a loan from a lending institution is still ex-
pected to put down 50% in order to get a home loan. See, e.g., Broich, Bayer, von Rom, Re-
structuring & Turnarounds, at http://www.broich.de/eng/restructuring-and-turnarounds.htm 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2004). 
102 U.S. General Accounting Ofªce, Tax Policy: Many Factors Contributed to 
the Growth in Home Equity Financing in the 1980s 12–14 (1993). While home equity 
loans grew at a rate of 20% per year between 1981–1991, other consumer debt increased by 
just 4% per year Id. at 1. For a more detailed exploration of the dilemma with home equity 
loans, see generally Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evalua-
tion of the Federal Government’s Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 373 (1994) 
(discussing the federal government’s promotion of home equity ªnancing). 
103 A recent radio advertisement asks “Did you know that there currently is available 
over $30 billion in equity in American real estate?” It then admonishes listeners not to let 
this money waste and to call an 800 number immediately to get the cash they deserve out 
of their home. 
104 Lord Madoc Arundel & Christopher T.C. Miller, The Governance of Real 
Property in England from Henry I to the Second Reiteration of Magna Carta, 
available at http://www.pbm.com/~lindahl/articles/land_law.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2004). 
105 See Nicola Clark, Frugal Europeans Hold up Recovery: Struggle Is on to Persuade Consum-
ers to Spend Despite Economic Uncertainty, Int’l Herald Tribune, July 22, 2004, at 1 (stating 
that strict banking laws make it difªcult, if not impossible, to extract added value from a 
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 Lending found its true cornucopia in the United States, however, 
with the introduction of the charge card in the 1960s, followed by the 
credit card in the 1970s and 1980s.106 Since then, there has been no 
turning back. 
B. Current U.S. Consumer Culture: Buying Happiness 
 U.S. citizens are considered proºigate in their personal lives as 
well as their business lives, particularly in comparison to other world 
citizens.107 While the last subsection attempts to explain how these 
habits developed, this subsection examines how U.S. society views 
debt today, and what current legal, cultural, and economic factors 
have led to the country’s “compulsively” consumeristic behavior.108 It 
also examines the ªnancial and other life conditions of most individ-
ual bankruptcy debtors in the United States and discusses whether 
there is a different bankruptcy or debt culture for U.S. business debt-
ors, as compared to individual consumer debtors. 
1. How and Why We Spend It: Let Us Count the Ways 
 Consumer spending is considered one of the most important in-
dicators of economic health in the U.S. economy. 109 Despite the 
                                                                                                                      
mortage through a home equity loan). With this background, one can begin to under-
stand how the U.S. bankruptcy system of debt forgiveness came into being. What is not 
clear is whether the countries that are importing aspects of the U.S. bankruptcy system 
actually need this system or will need it. Will they also become highly consumeristic be-
cause that is where globalization will take them? As stereotypes would have it; some Euro-
peans are known for having one small closet ªlled with a few expensive pieces of clothing, 
whereas U.S. citizens prefer a huge closet full of moderately priced items, a reºection of 
differing consumer cultures. Not all Europeans are cut from the same spending mold, 
however. The Italians love beautiful things while northern Europeans would consider high-
ticket fashion items to be highly unnecessary. 
106 See Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the United States and Japan, 55 
Vand. L. Rev. 1055, 1064 (2002). As Mann explains, American Express, Diners Club, and 
Carte Blanche ªrst offered charge cards, which, as their name implies, had to be paid off 
each month. See id. The big proªts occurred with the development of the credit card, and 
the resulting high interests rates to lenders. See id. These did not blossom until the 1970s 
and the 1980s in the United States, see id., and still have not done so throughout the rest of 
the world. See id. at 1056–57. Mann attempts to explain this phenomenon by examining 
the banking and lending systems of the United States versus other parts of the world, par-
ticularly Japan. See id. 
107 See Jacob S. Ziegel, The Fragile Middle Class: Americans in Debt, Discussed from a Cana-
dian Perspective, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1241, 1244 (2001). 
108 See id. 
109 Consumer spending is one of the major indicators by which the government and 
economists measure the strength of our economy. Consumer spending makes up about 
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credit industry’s claims that consumers are abusing credit, credit in-
dustry advertising encourages people to use as much credit as they 
can get, for every use imaginable or no particular use at all.110 Some 
advertisers rely on nostalgia to get people to borrow as much money 
as possible. For example, in a mailer for a home equity loan, United 
Pan Am Mortgage writes: 
[r]emember the days when dad worked, mom managed the 
home, and there was still enough money for a house, cars, 
vacations . . . even college? It’s sure not like that anymore. 
Today, with single parents or even with both parents work-
ing, it’s hard to make ends meet, let alone have some of the 
good things life offers. We think you deserve more and we 
can help. . . . A friendly phone call will get the ball rolling on 
putting a lump sum in your pocket. That’s right—have the 
extra cash to make those home improvements you’ve been 
putting off, take that vacation you’ve been dreaming about, 
give yourself peace of mind, knowing your son or daughter’s 
tuition is covered.111
The advertisement goes on to tell the recipient whom to call to get a 
home equity loan to solve all of life’s problems, demonstrating that, 
despite popular belief, you can buy both happiness and peace of 
mind.112
                                                                                                                      
two-thirds of our gross domestic product, which is the broadest measure of economic 
health. See Gongloff, supra note 7. 
Consumer spending is widely believed to be a measure of overall consumer 
conªdence. When a household is deciding what it can afford, it will look at probable fu-
ture income as well as current income. If consumers are optimistic about the future econ-
omy, they will be inclined to spend their dispensable income. If, however, they do not be-
lieve that good times lay ahead, they are more likely to save their money. Thomas Mayer 
et al., Money, Banking, and the Economy 273 (1999). 
110 One advertisement admonishes U.S. citizens to get the money they deserve by tap-
ping into the $30 trillion dollars in equity currently available in U.S. real estate. No men-
tion is made of the need to pay such funds back. In a title loan company advertisement, a 
woman ªnds that as long as she takes out a title loan, she has the money to go out to din-
ner after all. In another advertisement, Mr. T tells a huge, slovenly debtor that all his 
ªnancial problems can be solved if he takes out a title loan. In a MasterCard advertise-
ment, a man in a cubicle becomes ecstatic beyond words when he wins a trip to Hawaii 
from his benevolent credit card company. Businesses advertising on every network offer 
free credit for 6–12 months, as long as you spend a certain dollar amount, and even the 
government told U.S. citizens to go out and spend money last fall (despite high bank-
ruptcy rates and low savings rates) in order to breath life into the ºagging economy. 
111 Letter from United Pan Am Mortgage to Professor Frederick M. Hart (Sept. 30, 
2002) (on ªle with the author). 
112 See id. 
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 U.S. popular culture oozes with references to spending and hap-
piness. In the tongue-in-cheek novel, Shopaholic Ties the Knot, Becky 
Bloomwood notes how her whole life will change when she and her 
beau own the vintage cocktail cabinet she spots in an antique shop: 
Just think, if we had one of these in the apartment it would 
change our lives. Every night Luke and I would mix martinis, 
and dance to old-fashioned songs, and watch the sun go down. 
It’d be so atmospheric! We’d have to buy one of those old-
fashioned record players with the big horns, and start collect-
ing 78s, and I’d start wearing gorgeous vintage tea dresses.113
 As a result of relentless and unyielding admonitions to spend, as 
well as other cultural factors, U.S. citizens have more debt of all kinds 
than all persons of all other parts of the world.114 Consumer debt, 
second mortgages, foreclosures,115 and personal bankruptcies are all 
at an all-time high.116 The average household carries $8,000 in credit 
card debt117 and record numbers of U.S. citizens now carry more than 
one mortgage.118 Between 1979 and 1997, personal bankruptcies in-
                                                                                                                      
113 Sophie Kinsella, Shopaholic Ties the Knot 8 (2002) 
114 I respectfully disagree with Professor Ronald Mann’s conclusion that neither Japa-
nese nor U.S. consumers are encouraged to over-extend. See Mann, supra note 106, at 1084 
n.107 (citing Robert D. Manning, Credit Card Nation: The Consequences of Amer-
ica’s Addiction to Credit 3 (2002)). Mann proposes that U.S. society does not venerate 
those who rely on credit beyond their income. See id. Unfortunately, I believe that Man-
ning is just a voice in the wilderness on this point, with U.S. media having won the war 
against sensible credit use. 
115 Thomas A. Fogarty, Home Foreclosures at 30-Year High, USA Today, Sept. 11, 2002, at A1, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/perª/housing/2002–09–09-foreclosure_x.htm 
(last visited Dec. 4, 2004). Fogarty reports that during April, May, and June of 2002, 1.23% of 
all mortgages—or 640,000—were in foreclosure. See id. This is the highest rate recorded in 
the 30 years since this data has been kept, and is up from 1% just one year ago. See id. 
116 See Am. Bankr. Inst., Quarterly U.S. Bank Statistics, at http://abiworld.org/ 
statistics (last visited Dec. 4, 2004). Yet, at least one scholar has wondered why more U.S. 
households do not ªle for bankruptcy, concluding that as of 1998, only about 1% of 
households ªle but 15% could beneªt from such a ªling. See Michelle J. White, Why Don’t 
More Households File for Bankruptcy?, 14 J.L. Econ. & Org. 205(1998). 
117 CardFAQs - Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.cardweb.com/cardlearn/faqs/ 
2003/jan/8.xcml (last visited Dec. 4, 2004). 
118 See generally Riva D. Atlas, Home Equity Borrowing Rises to Worrisome Levels, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 26, 2003, at C1 (stating that home equity loan levels have reached such a high level 
that consumer groups think many people will be unable to service these loans and will end 
up homeless). Some lenders, including Wells Fargo Bank, are even lending up to 100% of 
the home’s value, despite the fact that people often have insufªcient income to service 
such loans. Id. 
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creased by more than 400%.119 The upsurge in the mid-1990s was par-
ticularly shocking because this was a period of widespread economic 
recovery.120 History partially explains why this debt picture looks so 
different from that of the rest of the world. Add a volatile economy 
and job market, and the credit industry’s voracious appetite for more 
lending, and the statistics are not surprising.121
2. Personal Bankruptcy and Stigma in the United States 
 While some people insist that the stigma of bankruptcy is gone,122 
empirical research suggests that it may not be that simple.123 In their 
empirical study, The Fragile Middle Class, scholars and empiricists Sulli-
van, Warren, and Westbrook conclude that bankruptcy is a treatment of 
a ªnancial problem but is not itself the disease.124 They conclude that 
unemployment or underemployment, illness, and divorce are the pri-
mary causes of bankruptcy in the United States, but that huge amounts 
of consumer debt in general, and credit card debt in particular, lower 
U.S. citizens’ threshold for collapse when ªnancial disasters strikes.125
                                                                                                                      
119 See Theresa Sullivan et al., The Fragile Middle Class 3 (2000). Since World 
War II, personal bankruptcies have steadily increased most years. “These increases acceler-
ated during the 1980s and 1990s, frequently breaking records from quarter to quarter and 
year to year.” Id. 
120 Id. As the authors state, ªnancial collapse amidst all this prosperity was both mystify-
ing and worrisome. See id. 
121 See id. at 17. Department of Labor Statistics indicate that between 1995 and 1997, 8 
million U.S. workers were displaced, and that by 1998, 50% were re-employed at their old 
salaries, 25% were earning 20% less, and the other 25% were still unemployed. See id. 
122 Some bankruptcy experts and policy-makers believe an increased willingness to de-
clare bankruptcy and a diminishment in the social stigma attached to it are largely respon-
sible for the recent jump in ªlings. See Michelle Clark Neely, Personal Bankruptcy: The New 
American Pastime?, The Regional Economist (Oct. 1998), at http://www.stlouisfed.org/ 
publications/re/1998/d/re1998d4.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2004). This is hardly strong 
proof that the stigma is gone. See Sherry Qualters, Once a Stigma, Ch. 11 Seen as Management 
Tool, Boston Bus. J., July 12, 2002, at 1; Gregory E. Maggs, Bankruptcy as a Business Tool, 71 
Tex. L. Rev. 681, 684–87 (1993) (reviewing Kevin J. Delaney, Strategic Bankruptcy: 
How Corporations and Creditors Use Chapter 11 to Their Advantage (1992)) (de-
scribing the development of strategic uses for Chapter 11, while reviewing a book whose 
name speaks for itself); American Financial Services Association, Explaining the Escalation in 
Personal Bankruptcies, Spotlight on Financial Services, at http://www.spotlightonªnance. 
org/issues/march/stories/story7.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2004); see also Skeel, supra note 
36, at 1 (discussing the issue of stigma in general). 
123 See Sullivan et al., supra note 119, at 263. 
124 See generally id. 
125 See id. at 22. While only 10% of the consumers in the authors’ empirical study re-
ported that consumer or credit card debt as the actual cause of their bankruptcy, in most 
cases, the debtor could have withstood the layoff, illness, or family breakup, if not for their 
crushing amounts of consumer debts. See id. 
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 Credit card use in the United States has risen steadily every year 
since the cards were introduced.126 In the ªfteen years from 1980 to 
1995, the amount of outstanding revolving credit jumped seven-
fold.127 Credit card debt doubled in just four years, from $211 billion 
in 1993 to $422 billion in 1997. Both the number of cards and the bal-
ances increased dramatically in this time period, yet 3.5 billion credit 
card solicitations were sent out thereafter in 1998, portending con-
tinuing increases.128 One historical event explains the rise in credit 
card debt, namely deregulation of consumer interest rates, which has 
made credit card lending more proªtable than any other form of 
lending.129 The more cardholders a company has, the more money it 
makes, even if this is accomplished by lowering lending standards.130
 Sub-prime lending, meaning lending speciªcally to people who 
are living on the edge, is the most proªtable niche in lending.131 Yet 
traditional banking has declined in proªtability, making it necessary 
for lenders to make ends meet in other ways. A popular long-term 
strategy is to get college students hooked on credit cars early, giving 
away free t-shirts and requiring no income.132 Some 83% of under-
graduate students have at least one credit card, a 24% increase since 
1998, and 21% of undergraduates who have cards have high-level bal-
ances between $3,000 and $7,000.133
 The existence of all this consumer credit does not mean that peo-
ple do not feel guilty when they fail to keep up with their payments. 
                                                                                                                      
126 See id. at 123. 
127 See id. By the 1990s economists speculated that U.S. citizens could tolerate no more 
credit card debt. Since 1993, however, growth in credit card debt has been greater than 
any other type of consumer loan. See id. 
128 The bankruptcy debtors in the study carried more credit card debt than the aver-
age U.S. citizen, but most are now carrying more than they can afford to repay. This is 
because there is virtually no limit to the amount of credit a person can obtain through 
credit cards. See id. The credit card industry did not grow to its current size by being cau-
tious about distributing cards. See id. at 135. It grew because it distributed cards freely, and 
solicited new customers relentlessly, at a cost of $100 in solicitation for every new card 
member acquired in 1994. See id. 
129 See id. at 135. 
130 See id. at 123. Interest rates drive proªtability, and interest payments account for 
more than 80% of the proªts of credit card companies. The enormous proªts available 
from people who charge up to the limit and pay only the minimum monthly payment 
make delinquent cardholders the most valued customers in the business. See id. 
131 See id. at 135–36. 
132 See id. 137. 
133 Nellie Mae, Undergraduate Students and Credit Cards: An Analysis of Usage 
Rates and Trends 1, available at http://www.nelliemae.com/library/ccstudy_2001.pdf (Apr. 
2002) (last visited Dec. 4, 2004). 
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Studies show that most people feel bad when they are unable to pay 
their debts,134 despite deep societal ambivalence about consumer 
debt.135 Economists recommend that increased consumption is neces-
sary to economic growth.136 In mainstream U.S news media, such as the 
Wall Street Journal, consumer spending is equated consistently with hap-
piness and health.137 For example, in an article titled Consumers’ Atti-
tudes Brighten, the author claims that “[c]onsumers’ spirits picked up a 
bit in early December, an encouraging sign for retailers hoping for a 
strong holiday season.”138 The story then claims that “consumer senti-
ment” and “consumer attitudes” have improved, causing economists to 
conclude that the waning economy might be improving.139
 The nature of the U.S. economic system, however, makes some 
ªnancial failure a certainty. The dynamics of capitalism, combined 
with a thin social safety net, guarantee that some families will fail: 
[w]ithout universal health insurance to protect every family 
from the ªnancial ravages of illness and without higher lev-
els of unemployment compensation to cushion the effects of 
                                                                                                                      
134 See Sullivan et al., supra note 119, at 139–40. 
135 See id. at 23. 
136 See President George W. Bush, Speech to Congress, (Sept. 20, 2001), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920–8.html (last visited Nov. 22, 
2004). Moreover, in the wake of September 11, President Bush told us that we could all ªght 
terrorism by being good consumers. Id. The Federal Reserve then encouraged consumer 
spending by repeatedly cutting interest rates over the next few months. See U.S Economy 
Shrinks, Money.CNN.Com, at http://money.cnn.com/2001/10/31/economy/economy/ 
(Oct. 31, 2001) (last visited Nov. 22, 2004). Again, on January 7, 2003, President Bush deliv-
ered a speech in which he encouraged U.S. citizens to be good consumers in spite of the 
economic stand-still. See President George W. Bush, Speech to the Economic Club of Chicago 
( Jan. 7, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030107-
5.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2004). 
137 See, e.g., Greg Ip, Consumers’ Attitudes Brighten, Wall St. J., Dec. 16, 2002, at A2 (dis-
cussing the possibility of economic recovery). 
138 Id. This top ªnancial newspaper often devotes an entire two-page spread to bank-
ruptcy and consumer sentiments. For example, on Monday, December 16, 2002, the paper 
not only contained this story about whether consumer spending would be “bright” enough 
to give retailers a proªtable Christmas season, but also included a comparison of Austra-
lian bankruptcy and U.S. bankruptcy, and an article about United Airlines’ request to bor-
row $2.4 billion from its union’s pension plan to fund its Chapter 11 activities. See id.; 
Sarah McBride, Australia’s Tough-Minded Bankruptcies May Serve as Role Model, Wall St. J., 
Dec. 16, 2002, at A2; Susan Carey, United Lobbies for More Savings from Its Unions, Wall St. J., 
Dec. 16, 2002, at A2. 
139 See Ip, supra note 137, at A2. News stories of this kind equate good moods or spirits 
with high consumer spending, even though more personal ªnancial failures occur after 
the holidays than at any other time of year. It is not surprising that we have as much debt 
as we do, when we are told that spending on consumer goods is critical to keeping our 
economy viable. 
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a layoff, each day, in good times and in bad, some families 
will fall over the ªnancial edge. And in a market that pro-
vides virtually unlimited amounts of consumer credit, some 
people will accumulate a debt load that eventually takes on a 
life of its own—swelling on compound interest, default rates, 
and penalty payments until it consumes every available dol-
lar of income and still demands more. Just as the poor will 
always be with us, so will the bankrupt middle class.140
A more protective consumer bankruptcy system seems to be directly 
related to the size of the social safety net and the availability of con-
sumer credit.141 The United States admittedly offers more families sanc-
tuary in bankruptcy, while at the same time offering a wide open con-
sumer credit economy with no limit on lending or interest rates, and 
few protections from the economic consequences of other problems 
such as job loss, illness, accidents, and family breakdowns.142 None of 
this makes bankruptcy pleasant, although at least it is available.143 
                                                                                                                      
140 See Sullivan et al., supra note 119, at 3. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook uncover 
a few surprising facts about bankruptcy debtors in this study, including that bankruptcy 
rates are very similar across racial and ethnic lines, see id. at 41–47, that bankruptcy debtors 
come from a cross-section of occupations, see id. at 59, that debtors tend to be from the 
middle rather than the lower classes, see id. at 55, and that bankruptcy debtors are more 
likely to have attended college than the average citizen, see id. at 51–55. This last statistic 
can be read several different ways. What the study actually showed was that bankruptcy 
debtors were more likely to have attended college than the general population, but less 
likely than average to have graduated from college. Thus, more went to college but few 
graduated. Is it possible that the study actually showed that bankruptcy debtors were more 
likely to try new things but less likely to stick with them? These are not the conclusions 
drawn by the authors, see id. at 55, but the numbers did suggest these alternative conclu-
sions to me. 
141 See id. at 259. 
142 See id. Whether these high levels of consumer bankruptcies are seen as a societal 
problem or not, it is clear that consumer bankruptcy is the ultimate free-market solution 
to bad debt. It forces individual creditors who have made voluntary decisions to lend to 
recoup the losses from bad loans out of the proªts of the good ones. And recoup they 
have, earning the highest proªts in lending history despite all the defaults. Bankruptcy is 
the market-driven choice to deal with privatized rather than socialized risk. See id. at 260–
61. Moreover, while creditor-funded campaigns to restrict consumers’ access to bankruptcy 
have been both popular and successful in Congress, there have been no campaigns to 
restrict access to credit. That type of legislation would be seen as anti-capitalist and pater-
nalistic. Many would say that individuals should be allowed to make their own choices 
about credit and should be responsible for their own decision-making and the resulting 
consequences. 
143 Data collected by the Consumer Federation of America suggests that despite the 
constant barrage of solicitations, acceptance of new cards has ªnally stemmed to some 
extent. See Consumer Fed’n of Am., Credit Card Issuers Expand Marketing and Available Credit 
While Consumers Increasingly Say No, at http://www.consumerfed.org/081402bankruptcy_ 
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While there may be more people ªling for personal bankruptcy in the 
United States than ever before, the “sting of failure is still sharply felt by 
those who must publicly declare that they are bankrupt.”144 And, while 
some U.S. citizens may try to buck the trend and consume less, strong 
societal pressures keep most of Americans spending.145
3. Business Bankruptcy and Stigma in the United States 
 When it comes to stigma, however, business bankruptcy in the 
United States is an entirely different matter.146 There seems to be less 
stigma associated with a failing business in the United States than with 
a personal bankruptcy, probably due to the U.S. notion that some risk 
is good and necessary to a well-functioning capitalist economy. The 
United States considers business failure to be negative but not morally 
wrong. Americans rarely throw corporate ofªcers in jail for failing at 
                                                                                                                      
credit_card_report_02_2.html (Aug. 15, 2002) (last visited Nov. 22, 2004). In the twelve 
month period ending March 31, 2002, card issuers mailed ªve billion solicitations, nearly 
ªfty per household. They now make available more than $3 trillion in unused credit, or 
$30,000 per household. Id. Yet consumers are increasingly rejecting more of these solicita-
tions and refusing to expand their lines of credit. Id. During the ªrst three months of 
2002, revolving consumer debt declined by $29 billion, bringing the ratio of credit used to 
a low of 22.1%. Id. There is some indication that British subjects are also cutting back a bit 
on credit. The Credit Card Research Group (CCRG) reports that total credit card spend-
ing in the United Kingdom (UK) rose to £16.8 billion in September 2002, up 6.9% from 
the same period the prior year. This rate of growth, while high, is lower than the increase 
for the same period last year, which was 10%. See Credit Card Spending Eases, News.BBC. 
Co.UK, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2409655.stm (Nov. 6, 2002) (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2004). 
My own sense is that if means testing is implemented in the United States, this may 
eventually backªre on the credit industry and cause at least the educated middle-class 
consumers to use less credit, thus reducing the industry’s proªt margins. If this happens, 
the industry may respond by granting more credit to less educated and poorer consumers, 
increasing the gap between the haves and the have-nots. No doubt, the credit industry is 
already recognizing that the new bill might not be good for business. In one article, a 
banking industry representative stated the following: “The one-sided provisions of this bill 
are bad news for consumers. But they are also bad news for our industry. Consumers are 
our customers. By creating a form of debt imprisonment, this bill will hobble the most 
important player in the world economy—the American consumer.” See Arkadi Kuhlmann, 
Bankruptcy Bill Hurts Odds of Second Chance, Am. Banker, Mar. 5, 2004, at 11. 
144 See Sullivan et al., supra note 119, at 260. 
145 For help scaling back, see Bankrate’s Guide to Managing Credit, at http://www. bank 
rate.com/brm/news/credit-management/debt-home.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2004). 
146 See White & Chase LLP, Bankruptcy and a Fresh Start: Stigma on Failure and 
Legal Consequences of Bankruptcy 10 (European Comm., U.S. Report, 2002), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/entrepreneurship/support_measures/failure_bank 
ruptcy/stigma_study/report_usa.pdf (stating that although the stigma associated with ªling 
for Chapter 11 has diminished substantially, “the decision to commence a Chapter 11 case is 
never easy.”) (last visited Oct. 28, 2004). 
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business. In fact, in some industries, like the high-tech or dot-com in-
dustries, going through a business failure actually can be seen as a 
badge of honor, proof that the entrepreneurs were willing to take the 
kinds of risks necessary to fuel capitalism.147
 In other industries, the United States seems to recognize as a soci-
ety that one-time events can cause business failure, or that sometimes a 
change in market conditions cannot be predicted and is better sof-
tened by Chapter 11 if the company is at stake. In any case, Americans 
do not like business failure, but they ªnd it more acceptable than per-
sonal bankruptcy.148 This distinction appears to be shared throughout 
most of the world. Unlike the rest of the world, however, the United 
States also recognizes that personal ªnancial failure can be caused by 
business failure, and thus provides systems to help both failing busi-
nesses and failing individuals.149
                                                                                                                      
147 See Theresa Forsman, Failure as a Badge of Honor, BusinessWeek Online, at http:// 
www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01_35/b3746632.htm (Aug. 27, 2001) (last vis-
ited Nov. 22, 2004). 
148 This could also be due to the uniquely U.S. corporate concepts of limited liability, 
given that we tend to see businesses as entities separate and apart from their owners and 
managers. See Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Perspectives on the Evolution of the Unincorpo-
rated Firm: An Introduction, 26 J. Corp. L. 803, 807 (2001) (discussing how some European 
scholars believe, for example, that extending limited liability to small ªrms will cause 
moral hazard and that as such, the costs of extending limited liability to such ªrms would 
outweigh the beneªts to society of doing so). 
149 Bi-partisan politics continue to play an important role in the development of bank-
ruptcy laws, though in some respects these politics are counter-intuitive. The credit indus-
try, particularly the consumer credit industry, has pushed tremendously in recent years for 
stricter bankruptcy laws for consumers that require larger paybacks on old debts. See Eliza-
beth Warren, The Changing Politics of American Bankruptcy Reform, 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 
189, 192–93 (1999). These sentiments, though not entirely partisan, are generally thought 
to be Republican or conservative sentiments. See id. at 194. Underlying these views is a 
strong belief that individuals have overspent irresponsibly. Id. at 195; see Ame Wellman, 
Relief for the Poorest of All: How the Proposed Bankrutpcy Reform Would Impact Women and Chil-
dren, 6 J.L. & Pol’y 273, 274–75 (2002). Yet Republican or big-business interests, or even 
those interested in fueling the economy, have consistently admonished U.S. citizens to do 
the right thing and spend even more for the sake of economic growth. This seems incon-
sistent with the bankruptcy crack-down, given that the government ofªcials who have ad-
monished us to spend, as a group, know full well that most people now have more debt 
than they can repay and that savings rates are now negative in the United States. See Lester 
C. Thurow & Basler Zeitung, Surprising 1998 American Economic Strength, at http://www. 
com/articles/html/suprising.htm (Dec. 1998) (last visited Nov. 22, 2004) (reporting nega-
tive U.S. savings rates). Spending without going into debt is not an economic reality, yet we 
are still encouraged to do it. Moreover, the much-decried bankruptcy crack-down is most 
likely to hurt consumer credit interests rather than help them, when people reduce spend-
ing in reaction to the bankruptcy crack-down. 
On the other side of this political coin, it is no less ironic. Very liberal persons, though 
certainly not all Democrats, favor debtor-oriented bankruptcy laws like the ones in place now. 
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C. Thumbnail Sketch of the U.S. Systems: Debt Forgiveness for Both 
Individuals and Business 
 The bankruptcy systems that have resulted from the history, poli-
tics, and culture discussed above are also unique. First and foremost, 
they allow each bankruptcy debtor a choice about whether to attempt 
to pay back creditors or to just give up and walk away from debt.150 
This choice is generally not available in other parts of the world.151 
Moreover, as discussed below, businesses that are reorganizing can 
continue to operate through a Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding 
that is not overseen by a court-appointed administrator.152
1. Personal Bankruptcy in the United States: An Overview 
 Personal bankruptcies in the United States take one of two general 
forms. One can either give up all of one’s non-exempt assets153 in ex-
                                                                                                                      
See  Warren, supra note 149, at 194 (noting that liberals have traditionally considered bank-
ruptcy laws in the larger context of progressive social legislation). But, some of these people 
believe that excess spending on the part of U.S. citizens is so harmful to society that it could 
ultimately destroy the world and its resources. See id. at 195. While this would be deeply dis-
turbing if true, the idea of not spending is almost incomprehensible to U.S. citizens. Clearly, 
U.S. citizens operate in a culture of consumption and spending unlike any other in the 
world. Kurt Richebächer, Consumption: Recovery Leader or Potential Proªt-Killer?, Gold Dig. 
(Nov. 3, 2003), at http://www.gold-eagle.com/gold_digest_03/richebacher110303.html (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2004). 
150 Skeel supra note 36, at 1–2. 
151 See id. 
152 See id. 
153 In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, an estate is created to collect and sell property to satisfy 
the debt of the debtor. But, a debtor can claim certain assets exempt from the bankruptcy 
estate not to be sold for the beneªt of the creditors. “The historical purpose of these ex-
emption laws has been to protect a debtor from his creditors, to provide him with the basic 
necessities of life so that even if his creditors levy on all of his nonexempt property, the 
debtor will not be left destitute and a public charge.” H.R. Rep. No. 95–595, at 126 (1977), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6087. In the United States, a debtor ªling for bank-
ruptcy may choose between the federal or state exemptions, see 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2000), 
if the state in which the debtor is ªling has not “opted-out” of the federal bankruptcy ex-
emption scheme. Some examples in the federal exemption system include the following: 
1) up to $17,425 of equity in real or personal property used as a homestead, id. 
§ 522(d)(1); 2) up to $2,775 in one motor vehicle, id. § 522(d)(2); 3) up to $9,300 in 
household furnishings, id. § 522(d)(3); 4) up to $1,150 of jewelry, id. § 522(d)(4); 5) $925 
in any property (usually checking accounts), and if the debtor did not use the homestead 
exemption up to an additional $8,725, id. § 522(d)(5); 6) up to $1,750 in professional 
books or tools of the trade, id. § 522(d)(6), and the debtor’s right to receive payment for 
certain things such as social security, veteran beneªts, and alimony, id. § 522 (d) (10) (all 
the dollar ªgures are updated by the United States Congress periodically to reºect eco-
nomic conditions; these values are current through 2003). State exemption schemes were 
developed not because of bankruptcy but because of collection laws. Because each state 
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change for an almost immediate discharge of most of one’s unsecured 
debts,154 or one can choose to pay off creditors, either in whole or in 
part, over a period of three to ªve years, in which case one does not 
need to give up non-exempt assets as long as one pays at least the value 
of those non-exempt assets to creditors under the payout plan.155 
Again, the debtor, rather than creditors, makes this choice.156 The pay-
out-style bankruptcy also allows one to cure, stretch out, and sometimes 
reduce, secured debt that has gone into default, thereby forcing new 
payment terms on the secured creditor, who is precluded from repos-
sessing his or her collateral as long as the plan payments are made.157 
Additionally, Chapter 7 bankruptcy is almost entirely non-interven-
tionist because, assuming there is no objection from a creditor to a 
debtor’s discharge, the debtor is granted a discharge automatically.158
 The U.S. personal bankruptcy system is unquestionably the most 
forgiving in the world, and strongly encourages persons who have failed 
ªnancially to get back into the economy and try again.159 In many 
states, the exemptions are extremely generous, sometimes allowing in-
                                                                                                                      
has its own exemption legislation, there is quite a bit of difference between states. A per-
son ªling in Delaware, which has opted-out of the federal scheme, can only choose the 
Delaware exemptions, which are not generous. For example, a debtor can only exempt 
books, clothing, a seat or a pew in church, sewing machines, tools of the trade (limited to a 
certain amount in some counties), and pianos. See 10 Del. Code Ann. tit. x, § 4902 (1974 
& Supp. 2002). Delaware does not even have any type of homestead exemption. See id. 
Texas allows not only unlimited homestead exemptions, see Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 41.001 
(1984 & Supp. 2004), but also exempts up to $30,000 in personal property, which includes 
household furniture, tools and equipment, clothing, jewelry, ªrearms, and motor vehicles. 
See id. § 42.002. But Texas does not allow a checking account to be exempt like the federal 
exemptions. See id. Unlike Texas, Florida has opted out of most of the federal exemptions, 
see Fla. Stat.Ann. § 222.20 (1999 & Supp. 2002), but does allow all federal 11 U.S.C. 
§ 522(d)(10) exemptions. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 222.201 (1999 & Supp. 2002). Florida also has 
an unlimited homestead exemption. Fla. Const. art. VII, § 6(a)(1). However, Florida has 
a modest personal property exemption: only up to $1000 in personal property, Fla. 
Const. art. X, § 4(a)(2), and money contributed to retirement funds, Fla. Stat. Ann. 
§ 222.21 (1999 & Supp. 2002), and college trust funds, id. § 222.22. 
154 This is considered a straight liquidation bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the United 
States Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–784. 
155 This is considered a restructured debt plan under Chapter 13 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1330. 
156 See Skeel, supra note 36, at 2. 
157 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (allowing for the modiªcation of secured claims except 
secured claims on real property). This option of modifying a secured creditor’s interest is 
not available under a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. See id. §§ 701–784. 
158 See id. § 727. 
159 See Jacob Ziegel, Canada’s Phased-in Bankruptcy Reform, 70 Am. Bankr. L.J. 383, 404 
(1996). 
2005] The Role of History & Culture in Bankruptcy & Inslovency Systems 29 
dividual debtors an unlimited amount of equity in a home.160 Research 
suggests that states with higher exemptions, which allow an individual 
debtor to keep more assets free from creditor claims, have the highest 
levels of entrepreneurship in the country, again establishing the con-
nection between business activity and an incentive to take risks. 
2. The U.S. Business Reorganization Scheme and Its Rationale 
 The theory behind a Chapter 11 reorganization case in the United 
States is that a business enterprise161 is often worth more to a creditor 
alive than dead.162 In other words, a business may be able to pay credi-
tors more by continuing to operate its business, paying creditors a dis-
tribution over time from its future proªts, rather than simply liquidat-
ing its assets and paying creditors from the liquidation proceeds. 
Alternatively, a debtor can sell its business as a going concern while in 
Chapter 11, leaving enough time to sell property so that a good price 
can be realized for the business enterprise, and then use the proceeds 
to pay creditors through what is called a liquidating Chapter 11 plan.163 
In either case, the business is operated for a time while in Chapter 11 in 
order to avoid the waste that could occur if a business with accumulated 
goodwill was simply liquidated at the ªrst sign of ªnancial failure.164 
                                                                                                                      
160 See, e.g., Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 42.002 (2003); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 222.201 (2003) 
(allowing unlimited homestead exemptions in Texas and Florida, respectively). 
161 Chapter 11 is available to corporations, partnerships, as well as individuals. 11 
U.S.C. § 109(d). Because it is complicated and expensive in terms of legal fees, an individ-
ual normally will ªle a Chapter 13 instead, if his or her debts fall within the debt limita-
tions, namely, the debtor has noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less than 
$290,525 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than $871,550. See 11 U.S.C 
§ 109(e). 
162 See Davis, supra note 12, at 253. 
163 See id. at 256. In fact, the debtor is permitted to sell off its assets piecemeal in a 
Chapter 11, even before a plan is ªled, despite the fact that the formal name of this chap-
ter of the code is Reorganization. See id. About 20–30% of conªrmed plans are liquidation 
plans. Id.; see E. Flynn, Statistical Analysis of Chapter 11, at 12 (1989). 
164 The French commercial system takes actual steps to prevent companies from get-
ting into too much ªnancial trouble. Judges of the Commercial Courts have the power to 
summon the chief executive ofªcer (CEO) of any company that appears to be in ªnancial 
trouble. Once summoned, an informal hearing is held to discuss the information gathered 
by the court (the information is collected by the Clerk of the Court, who is also basically 
the Registrar of Companies, who has ªled information, such as liens, mortgages, and pref-
erences, on each company in the territory). The CEO is allowed to inform the judge of the 
types of measures the company is taking to right itself. After the hearing, the judge 1) can 
accept the measures discussed by the CEO; 2) gather more information concerning the 
company from many sources; 3) the CEO can ªle for a court agent to oversee the com-
pany; and 4) can urge the CEO to ªle for protection under French law. See Broude et al., 
supra note 6, at 536–39. 
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For the beneªt of stakeholders (such as creditors, equity holders, or 
owners) and employees, it is sometimes more efªcient and less wasteful 
to allow the business to reorganize its affairs, either through restructur-
ing its debt, by obtaining new equity owners, or both.165 While this the-
ory is not without its critics,166 the overwhelming worldview today is 
that some system for “rescuing” ailing businesses is a pre-condition to 
maintaining a vibrant, capitalist economy.167
 The shocking difference between U.S.-style reorganization and 
most others around the world is that current management of the fail-
ing company normally stays in place with no administrator directly 
overseeing the system.168 The historical development of this unique 
                                                                                                                      
165 Sometimes equity is distributed to the unsecured creditor class under the plan of 
reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (describing how equity cannot retain the 
stock unless unsecured creditor classes are paid in full or accept the plan). 
166 Some scholars feel that Chapter 11 is not worth its astronomical costs, or its drag on 
the economy, particularly given the relatively low success rate for reorganizing companies. 
See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 Stan. 
L. Rev. 311, 311 (1993); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping and Bankruptcy: 
A Reply to Warren, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815, 827–28 (1987) (stating that bankruptcy creates 
beneªts to bankrupt companies that are not available to others, creating perverse incen-
tives to ªle and giving some companies an unfair advantage); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy 
Case for Chapter 11 Corporate Reorganization, 15 J. Legal Stud. 127, 128 (1986); James W. 
Bowers, Wither What Hits the Fan? Murphy’s Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the Elementary Eco-
nomics of Loss Distribution, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 27 (1991) (arguing that Chapter 11 offers little to 
justify its existence); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 
11, 101 Yale L.J. 1043, 1049–50 (1992) (arguing that because equity holders rarely recover 
anything in Chapter 11, Chapter 11 should be repealed); Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. 
Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain, 
75 Va. L. Rev. 155, 160 (1989) (questioning the incentives created by the current bank-
ruptcy system). But see Gross, supra note 9, at 5 (claiming that 20%, one of the estimates of 
success rates in Chapter 11, is a respectable rate and evidence of the system’s success). 
It is true that Chapter 11 fees are notoriously expensive. Enron attorneys had spent 
over $331 million dollars as of March 2003, and the company was still nowhere near con-
ªrming a plan at that time. See Kristen Hays, Enron Proposes New Pipeline Business, Associ-
ated Press, Mar. 19, 2002, available at 2003 WL 16151125; see also Lucian Ayre Bebchuck, A 
New Approach to Corporate Reorganization, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 775, 780–81 (1988) (describing 
the numerous costs and inefªciencies in the current Chapter 11 scheme). Also, in highly 
regulated industries with large infrastructures, critics have argued that the Chapter 11 of 
one player in a closed industry can be unfair and harmful to the other ªrms in the indus-
try, and even weaken the other ªrms by allowing the company in bankruptcy to externalize 
pre-petition debts and undercut market prices, therefore recovering a greater market 
share. See Sarah McBride, Australia’s Tough-Minded Bankruptcies May Serve as Role Model, 
Wall St. J., Dec. 16, 2002, at A2. 
167 See Metzger & Bufford, supra note 4, at 153–54. 
168 Legal & Business Forms—Chapter 11 Reorganization, at http;//www.legal-forms-
kit.com/freelegaladvice/bankruptcy/8.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2005). While scholars 
have regularly noted that old management is often replaced with new management as the 
case proceeds, this is often because old management wishes to resign. 
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system derives from the ªrst reorganizations in the railroad industry, 
one the ªrst big businesses in the United States.169 At the time that 
Munroe Railroad and Banking, Co. defaulted on its obligations to its 
lenders, there was no mechanism in place to address this failure, 
other than the lender’s right to foreclose and the court’s equitable 
right to appoint a receiver to take over the debtor’s assets.170 Because 
piecemeal sale of the debtor’s assets would result in great ªnancial 
loss to all, the court merged these two legal concepts and ordered 
that the lender sell the assets all at once, pursuant to a going concern 
sale, rather than piecemeal.171
 Amazingly, this tiny innovation in foreclosure practice, which took 
place in the narrow context of failing U.S. railroads, led to a new way of 
looking at reorganization and value. Lenders continued to threaten 
foreclosure, but did not always follow through. Moreover, courts began 
appointing a receiver in each case, who would watch over and protect 
the debtor’s property and request an injunction against creditor collec-
tion efforts.172 This process was known as equity receivership and al-
lowed the business to continue in operation while the parties at-
tempted to negotiate a favorable resolution of the debt.173 Ultimately, 
after many twists and turns, the current Chapter 11 system emerged 
from this humble start. 
3. The Logistics of Chapter 11 Business Reorganization174
 Bankruptcy cases, of which Chapter 11 is one kind, are presided 
over by a specialized bankruptcy court that is part of the federal judi-
cial scheme.175 The law in place is the Federal Bankruptcy Code,176 
although some principles used in bankruptcy cases arise from state 
law.177 When an enterprise is in Chapter 11, it normally operates its 
own business through its pre-ªling management.178 No trustee is or-
                                                                                                                      
169 Skeel, supra note 36, at 57. 
170 See id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 58. 
173 Id. 
174 Chapter 11 can also be used by individuals. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(d). 
175 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2000) (establishing the bankruptcy court system). 
176 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330. 
177 See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (stating that “[u]nless a par-
ticular federal interest requires a different result, property interests are created and de-
ªned by state law”). 
178 But see 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a). Although it is unusual, a party in interest may seek the 
removal of the debtor and have a trustee appointed by showing cause, such as fraud or 
 
32 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 28:1 
dinarily appointed. As soon as a debtor ªles a voluntary Chapter 11 
case, 179 an automatic stay goes into effect, effectively stopping all col-
lection activity against the debtor or any of its property of any kind.180 
The stay is broad and powerful and even things that one would not 
think would be stayed are indeed stayed.181 For example, secured 
creditors are prohibited from taking any action to repossess collateral 
that they could repossess if not for the bankruptcy.182 Even the gov-
ernment is precluded from collecting on its claims.183 Virtually all en-
terprises,184 and even individuals,185 are eligible for Chapter 11 and 
there is no requirement that the debtor be insolvent in anyway.186 
                                                                                                                      
mismanagement. See id. This is in order to protect interests of creditors and equity holders. 
See id.; see also In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217 (3rd Cir. 1989) (upholding, reluc-
tantly, the trial court’s decision to appoint a trustee, because the debtor-in-possession had 
been unable to turn the company around, and because the debtor had conducted ques-
tionable transfers of property, had virtually violated its ªduciary duty by not pursuing 
claims to recover the transferred property, and had proven to be dishonest). 
179 In the United States, the vast majority of cases ªled under any chapter of the Bank-
ruptcy Code are voluntary cases. See generally Nathalie Martin, ¿Qué Es La Diferencia?: A 
Comparison of the First Days of a Business Reorganization Case in Mexico and the United States, 10 
U.S.-Mex. L.J. 73, 75 (2002). 
180 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). 
181 See Martin supra note 179, at 75 (“There is a very broad, automatic stay granted in 
favor of the debtor. This stays virtually all collection activity that is out there, including . . . 
employee claims, labor claims, and every other type of lawsuit.”). 
182 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). For a secured creditor, any party in interest for that mat-
ter must ask the court for permission to lift the stay in order to proceed for repossession. 
The court will grant relief only in limited circumstances. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d); see also 
Martin, supra note179, at 81. 
183 See Martin, supra note 179, at 79 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362) (stating that even govern-
ment entities must stop all collection efforts and can only maintain lawsuits against entities 
in bankruptcy if the issue affects health and public safety, which is interpreted very nar-
rowly); see also In re Universal Life Church, Inc., 128 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1997) (ªnd-
ing that the § 362(b)(4) police and regulatory exceptions to an automatic stay “refers to 
the enforcement of laws affecting health, welfare, morals and safety, but not regulatory 
laws that directly conºict with the control of the res or property by the bankruptcy court.”). 
The two tests to determine if a government action is a police and regulatory exception in 
nature are the “pecuniary purpose” test and the “public policy” test. Id. (citing NLRB v. 
Continental Hagen Corp., 932 F.2d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 1991)). “In the pecuniary purpose 
test, the court determines whether the government action relates primarily to the protec-
tion of the government’s pecuniary interest in the debtor’s property or to matters of pub-
lic safety and welfare. If the government action is pursued solely to advance a pecuniary 
interest of the governmental unit, the stay will be imposed.” Id. (citations omitted). 
184 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (deªning who can be a debtor under Chapter 11). Some ex-
amples of entities excluded from Chapter 11 are insurance companies, banks, savings 
banks, cooperative banks, savings and loan associations, building and loan associations, 
and homestead associations. Id. § 109(b). These exclusions include both domestic and 
foreign entities. Id. 
185 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(d). 
186 See Martin supra note 179, at 77. 
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Chapter 11 can be used as a strategic measure to stop lawsuits, to stop 
foreclosures, or for whatever purpose the debtor chooses.187 Practi-
cally speaking, one of the most beneªcial features of Chapter 11 is the 
captive audience that the debtor-in-possession has in its bankruptcy 
judge, who is available in record time to hear any emergency that 
could affect the debtor’s chances at rehabilitation.188
 The debtor’s goal in the case is to emerge from Chapter 11 with 
its debts restructured and also reduced in amount in most cases. This 
goal is achieved by obtaining approval of a Chapter 11 plan outlining 
how, to what extent, and over what time period debts will be repaid.189 
Creditors are allowed to vote on the debt restructuring plan, thus al-
lowing them to choose whether to go along with the debtor’s plan, 
propose their own plan, or choose to liquidate the debtor’s busi-
ness.190 If the debtor can get most creditors to vote in favor of the 
plan, it can be forced on the dissenting creditors who also will be 
bound by it.191 Sometimes the debtor can approve a plan, even if most 
creditors vote against the plan, although this is rare.192
 Secured creditors are normally paid in full with interest up to the 
lesser of the amount of the loan or the value of the collateral. If the 
debt is undersecured, all the deªciency claims become unsecured 
claims.193 Some creditors, such as taxing authorities and employee 
                                                                                                                      
187 See Maggs, supra note 122, at 685–86 (discussing how Texaco ªled its Chapter 11 
case in order to delay collection on Pennzoil’s $10.53 billion judgment, and ultimately to 
gain leverage to settle the judgment for $3 million). 
188 For example, US Airways recently tried to have a bankruptcy court intervene in a 
labor dispute on an immediate and emergency basis. See Susan Carey, UAL Says It Must Cut 
Expenses by More Than $1.1 Billion a Year, Wall St. J., Sept. 20, 2004, at A8 (discussing how 
the bankruptcy court may intervene to grant emergency relief to the company). 
189 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(2) (stating that the debtor has the exclusive right to ªle a 
plan for 120 days). 
190 See id. § 1129(a)(8) (discussing creditors’ rights to accept or reject a plan); id. 
§ 1126 (2000) (discussing how acceptance is accomplished); see also id. § 1121(c) (stating 
that any party in interest can ªle a plan, if certain criteria are met). 
191 See id. § 1129(b)(2) (describing the process of forcing a plan on classes of secured 
and unsecured creditors); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (describing when a class is deemed to 
have accepted a Chapter 11 plan). 
192 See id. § 1129(a)(10) (discussing how a Chapter 11 plan can be forced on dissenting 
creditors, as long as at least one class of creditors votes yes). 
193 See id. § 506(a). 
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the es-
tate has an interest . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such 
creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property, or to the extent of 
the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim to 
the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest or the amount so subject 
to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim. 
 
34 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 28:1 
claims, are entitled to special priority194 and must be paid in full in 
the plan.195 Unsecured creditors are often paid a distribution over 
time and are very rarely paid in full. The amounts not paid are dis-
charged at the end of the case and never paid.196 There is no set 
amount of distribution that unsecured creditors must receive, but the 
debtor needs the unsecured creditors’ votes and thus often offers as 
much as it can afford to pay. 
 Existing equity can retain their ownership of the debtor ªrm, but 
only if the unsecured creditors agree, or if unsecured creditors are 
paid in full.197 In a sense, creditors get to choose, through their voting 
rights,198 whether to go along with the reorganization plan, or alter-
natively, to liquidate the debtor’s business. In reality, however, the 
debtor usually retains control over the case and the plan process 
throughout the case, and has the exclusive right to ªle a plan for at 
least the ªrst four months of the case and often much longer.199 This 
leaves many creditors feeling like hostages in a debtor-friendly pro-
ceeding, but a case cannot go on forever.200 From this it seems clear 
that a business that is losing money will be liquidated almost immedi-
ately because the case is not likely to succeed at reorganization, and 
any delay will hurt creditors.201
D. Conclusions About the U.S. Scheme and Its Societal Role 
 U.S. bankruptcy systems did not emerge randomly or in a vac-
uum, but through conscious modern and historical decisions about 
the role of credit and money in U.S. society. These attitudes and con-
ditions are unique and are not present in other countries, including 
those countries currently adopting U.S.-style systems. This may limit 
the effectiveness of imported systems, and should lead countries that 
are adopting new systems to study other systems as well, and to con-
sider local culture when enacting new laws. 
                                                                                                                      
Id. 
194 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a). 
195 See id. § 1129(a)(9). 
196 See id. § 1141(d). 
197 See id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i). But, if under a plan an unsecured creditor is impaired by 
the plan, the court can still approve the plan if it is shown that the unsecured creditor 
would receive as much under a Chapter 7 liquidation plan. See id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). 
198 But see id. § 1129(a)(8) (stating that, if the creditor is not impaired by the plan and 
votes against the plan, the court can still verify the plan). 
199 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b). 
200 See id. § 1129(a)(11). 
201 Id. 
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II. Cross-Cultural Attitudes Toward Debt:  
Unripe Ground for Transplantation 
 Around the world, people are less forgiving about debt forgiveness 
than they are in the United States.202 In some parts of the world, not 
paying debts is the ultimate disgrace.203 In other parts of the world, 
there simply is no personal bankruptcy system,204 and little in the way 
of business reorganization either.205 Despite this, many countries are 
starting to move toward a U.S. bankruptcy reorganization model for 
businesses, and some are also replicating forgiving personal bankruptcy 
laws.206 Given the unique cultural, economic, and historical develop-
ment of the U.S. system, however, this may be impractical. This Section 
describes cultural attitudes toward debt in a few other parts of the 
world that are currently in the process of importing U.S.-style bank-
ruptcy laws. It suggests that history cannot be the sole driving factor in 
determining which bankruptcy system and philosophy a country devel-
ops, by describing the very different system and attitudes of England,207 
from which the original U.S. bankruptcy system arose. By way of further 
example, it then describes attitudes toward debt and bankruptcy in 
parts of continental Europe, as well as Japan, as a contrast to the U.S. 
attitudes previously discussed. The laws of these countries also are 
brieºy examined in order to discuss the role of both transplantation, as 
well as local culture, in enacting such laws.208
A. Historical Bankruptcy Perspectives Outside the U.S.:  
England as an Example 
 Because of its long history of commerce, England never had to 
sprint to catch up or otherwise create a quick market economy.209 
                                                                                                                      
202 See infra notes 235–308, and 380–513 and accompanying text. 
203 See infra notes 415–421 and accompanying text. 
204 See infra notes 235–267 and accompanying text. 
205 See infra notes 268–317 and accompanying text. 
206 See infra notes 268–308 and accompanying text. 
207 Martin, supra note 16, at 367. England, as well as Canada and Australia, have rela-
tively lenient personal bankruptcy systems by world standards. Id. at 367 n.1; see Efrat, supra 
note 3, at 88–90. Other countries that have more lenient personal bankruptcy systems, 
besides the United States, England, Canada, and Australia, include Hong Kong, New Zea-
land, Taiwan, Russia, Scotland, and the Netherlands. Martin, supra note 16, at 367 n.1. 
Virtually all of these countries impose a Chapter 13-like payment plan on at least some 
bankruptcy debtors before granting them a discharge. Id. 
208 See infra notes 209–513 and accompanying text. 
209 See England: History, Lonely Planet World Guide, at http://www.lonelyplanet.com/ 
destinations/europe/england/history.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2004). 
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While, initially, U.S. and English bankruptcy laws were quite similar, 
by the 1800s, English law had a very different emphasis and ºavor in 
regard to its treatment of debtors than early U.S. bankruptcy law.210 
England’s ªrst bankruptcy laws were created in 1543.211 The preamble 
to this law described the bankruptcy debtor as an anti-social, immoral 
character who regularly took advantage of others.212 The law itself was 
designed solely for the beneªt of creditors and was virtually criminal 
in nature.213 Bankruptcy was something creditors did to the debtor, 
an involuntary social condition to which a naughty user of credit was 
subjected against his will.214 Not surprisingly, then, early English bank-
                                                                                                                      
210 See Skeel, supra note 36, at 38 (stating that in the 1880s, English bankruptcy law was 
quite tough on debtors, who had to subject themselves to searching scrutiny and long dis-
charge delays). English law was hardly unique at the time in its tough treatment of bank-
ruptcy debtors. Common punishments around the world included forfeiture of all prop-
erty, relinquishment of the consortium of a spouse, imprisonment, and death. Early stories 
claim that in Rome, creditors were permitted to carve up the body of a debtor. See Tabb, 
History of Bankruptcy, supra note 33, at 7. 
211 See Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of the 
Voidable Preference, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 20 (1986). 
212 See id. The Preamble stated that 
[w]here divers and soondry persones craftelye obteyning into theyre handes 
greate substaunce of other mennes goods doo sodenlie ºee to partes un-
knowne or kepe theyre houses, not mynding to paie or restore to any of 
theyre creditours theyre debtes and dueties, but at theyre owne willes and 
pleasures consume the substaunce obteyned by credyte of other men, for 
theyre owne pleasure and delicate lyving, againste all reasone equity and 
good conscience. 
Id. 
213 See id. 
214 See Tabb, Evolution of Discharge, supra note 33, at 336. 
In 1542 Parliament enacted the ªrst English bankruptcy law, 34 & 35 Henry 
8, chapter 4, entitled ‘An act against such persons as do make bankrupts.’ As 
the title indicates, the act was not passed with any heed for the interests of the 
debtor. Instead, it was intended to give creditors another collection remedy. 
The new remedy lay against all fraudulent and absconding debtors (but not 
merely unfortunate debtors), referred to throughout the act as ‘offenders.’ 
This act, along with all of the early bankruptcy laws, was quasi-criminal in na-
ture, and provided for the imprisonment of the offender if necessary. A Brit-
ish commentator notes that ‘the law seems at that time to have been adminis-
tered with considerable severity.’ Id. Under this act (and for almost three 
centuries hence) bankruptcy was purely involuntary as to the debtor. The 
right to commence a bankruptcy proceeding rested solely in the hands of the 
creditors of the debtor. This limitation was perfectly consistent with the ra-
tionale of the act, which was to protect creditors and thus facilitate com-
merce. Upon notice the various assets of the debtor were seized, appraised, 
and sold, and the proceeds were distributed pro rata to all creditors proving 
just claims. 
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ruptcy laws were ªlled with numerous penalties and punishments for 
non-payment, the most well known of which was to “suffer as a felon, 
without the beneªt of clergy,” a polite phrase for the death penalty.215 
While few were actually subject to death for failing to pay their bills, 
debtors’ prison was common,216 as was being shunned by society in 
Dickensian fashion.217
 There was no debtor discharge, though there was plenty of 
credit, even as early as the 1600’s.218 The ªrst debtor discharge was 
introduced in the Statute of Anne in 1705, but this provision was only 
in place for three years.219 The debtor discharge later became part of 
the permanent law, but was granted upon application only, rather 
than automatically, after the debtor proved that he had been honest 
                                                                                                                      
Id. at 329–30. The ªrst voluntary bankruptcy law in England was passed in 1844 and ap-
plied to traders only. Id. at 353. This was extended to non-merchants in 1861. See id. at 354. 
215 See Tabb, Evolution of Discharge, supra note, 33 at 336. But see Weisburg, supra note 
211, at 6. Weisburg looks at a 1697 treatise by Daniel Defoe, vocal commentator on bank-
ruptcy law and its impact on society. In his “Essay on Projects,” Defoe sets out that the laws 
of England are, “generally good, and above all things are temper’d with Mercy, Lenity, and 
Freedom.” Id. But bankruptcy law 
has something in it of Barbarity; it gives loose to the Malice and Revenge of 
the Creditor, as well as a Power to right himself, while it leaves the Debtor no 
way to show himself honest: it contrives all the ways possible to drive the 
debtor to despair, encourages no new Industry, for it makes him perfectly in-
capable of anything but starving. 
Id. Sentiments such as Defoe’s clearly show that society, as a whole, was conscious of the ill 
effect the law had on the average bankrupt. See id. 
216 See Tabb, History of Bankruptcy, supra note 33, at 7. 
217 For an example of England’s historical perception of bankruptcy in the nineteenth 
century, one should read Dickens’ The Little Dorrit. See generally Charles Dickens, The 
Little Dorrit (Dodd, Mead 1951) (1857) (a story about a father and his family living 
and growing up in the Swansea debtors’ prison). Dickens’ tale is not unlike Defoe’s senti-
ment referred to supra in note 215. Essentially, the bankrupt was treated like a leper, and 
the prison was like a leper colony. Mr. Dorrit ªnally gets out of prison after receiving a 
windfall in inheritance, spends it all, and then dies before being forced to return to debt-
ors’ prison. The story’s main focus is on how bankruptcy impacts the family unit and how 
it is truly punitive in nature. 
218 See Tabb, Evolution of Discharge, supra note 33, at 330. 
219 See id. at 333. Tabb also notes that discharge was not automatic. The bankrupt 
needed to receive a “certiªcate of conformity.” To receive this, the bankrupt needed to 
surrender voluntarily to an examination by the court, to full disclosure, and to delivery of 
all the bankrupt’s assets to the court. The court maintained the power to deny the 
certiªcate, but this discretion was seldom used. What is interesting is that creditors at the 
time had no power to block the bankrupt’s receipt of the certiªcate. See id. at 333–34. One 
could argue that this was one of the ªrst pro-debtor bankruptcy laws, but as will be seen, 
the act lasted all but three years. See id at 333. 
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and had cooperated with creditors.220 Until 1705, a bankruptcy dis-
charge was only available to merchants, as credit was seen as unneces-
sary and even a fraud if obtained outside the commercial context.221 
Unlike the early U.S. economic climate, in which every man was seen 
as a potential merchant who could help grow the economy, early Eng-
lish society accepted credit only as a necessary evil.222 While laws 
themselves became more lenient over time, this attitude toward debt 
and credit never really changed. 
B. Attitudes Toward Debt in England Today 
 Even today, English people are sensitive about ªnancial failure.223 
They generally consider such failure to be a failure of character and 
consider it extremely negative if a person, or even a business, fails 
ªnancially. Strictly personal bankruptcies, resulting from too much 
credit card debt or the loss of a job or good health, have been rare in 
the past because there was little consumer credit, and government 
programs helped people if they lost employment or needed health 
care.224 Now there is more credit and more personal ªnancial failure. 
 While England and Wales only had 0.47 personal bankruptcy ªl-
ings for every 1000 individuals in 1997 (as compared to 5 personal 
bankruptcy ªlings for every 1000 that same year in the United 
States),225 these are still considered major embarrassments, even if they 
result from the failure of a business.226 Executives in a company that 
                                                                                                                      
220 See id. at 339. This provision is still popular in the personal bankruptcy laws of many 
countries today. 
221 See Tabb, Evolution of Discharge, supra note 33, at 335–36. 
222 See Weisberg, supra note 211, at 66. As Professor Weisberg notes, in the United 
States, bankruptcy law was seen as a “robust, economical, and scientiªc instrument of 
commercial efªciency.” See id. In England, credit was morally tinged and represented false 
wealth to many people in the traditional land-based society. See id. at 13. 
223 See id. 
224 See James A. Morone & Janice M. Goggin, Health Policies in Europe: Welfare States in a 
Market Era, 20 J. Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 557, 558, 563 (1995) (noting that England cur-
rently has a state-run health care system, but that it and other similar European systems 
may soon be “Americanized”). 
225 See Efrat, supra note 3, at 100–01. English bankruptcy rates are higher than those in 
most other parts of Europe. See Michael Harrison, Personal British Bankruptcies Hit 10-Year 
High, The Fed. Cap. Press of Austl., Nov. 10, 2003, at A17 (stating that high rates of 
bankruptcy in Britain are the result of the explosion of consumer credit). 
226 As an example of how harsh the “bankrupt” was treated by the early British code, 
consider that a nonconforming bankrupt was subject to the death penalty and that to ob-
tain a discharge the bankrupt had “to (i) secure a certiªcate of conformity from a majority 
of ‘bankruptcy commissioners,’ (ii) obtain such a certiªcate from four-ªfths of creditors, 
in value and number, and (iii) swear that the creditor certiªcates ‘were obtained fairly and 
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fails can have a very difªcult time ªnding another job and are often 
shunned socially.227 Thus, despite all the new credit available, the Eng-
lish marketplace comes down hard on those who have gotten into 
ªnancial difªculty. The attitude is “once a bankrupt, always a bank-
rupt.”228 The government is likely to be unable to tell people how to 
think or whom to invite to parties, even through drastic legal change. 
C. Attitudes Toward Debt in Continental Europe: Do the Laws Reºect Them? 
 Henry Kissinger once noted that when he wants to talk to Eur-
poe, he’s not sure whom to call.229 While this may be changing, now 
that the EU is working on unifying currency and laws, Europe still 
consists of many diverse cultures, has a huge variety of insolvency sys-
tems, and contains a host of diverging philosophies about debt.230
 As a rule, ªnancial failure on the continent carries signiªcantly 
more stigma than in the common law countries, and the personal 
bankruptcy laws are less forgiving than those in the common law 
countries.231 Reorganization laws are far more varied and reºect other 
societal concerns.232 European governments are attempting to reduce 
the negative stigma associated with business failure in order to fuel 
                                                                                                                      
without fraud.’” Peter V. Pantaleo, Basic Business Bankruptcy, PRACTICING L. INST., COM-
MERCIAL LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 7, 11 (1992). 
227See, e.g., David Gow, Former Alstom Chief to Return His £2.7 Million Pay-off, Guardian 
Unlimited, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/executivepay/story/0,1204,1021483,00.html (Aug. 
19, 2003) (last visited Nov. 22, 2004) (discussing the public disdain at a corporate ofªcer who 
received a golden parachute before the company failed). 
228 See Lucinda Kemeny & Garth Alexander, Blair Chases American Dream, Times (Lon-
don), Feb. 18, 2001, at A1 (noting mantra of “once a bankrupt, always a bankrupt”). The 
United States did away with the word bankrupt in the 1978 Code, replacing it with the 
more genteel “debtor,” exactly because bankrupt carried such negative stigma. Donald R. 
Price & Mark C. Rahdert, Distributing the First Fruits: Statutory and Constitutional Implicaitons 
of Tithing in Bankrutpcy, 26 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 853, 862 n.33 (1993) (stating that the 1978 
Reform Act, which created the current Bankruptcy Code, does not refer to the word 
“bankrupt” but uses the more euphemistic word “debtor” instead). 
229 Steven Pearson, Successful Restructuring Requires Sensitivity, The Financial News, 
Dec. 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 24141004. 
230 See infra notes 230–307 and accompanying text. 
231 See Efrat, supra note 3, at 100–101. 
232 See infra notes 259–308 and accompanying text. 
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entrepreneurial spirit.233 Many countries, as well as lawmakers of the 
newly formed EU, are looking to the United States for ideas.234
1. Continental Credit Use and Personal Bankruptcy Systems 
 Personal bankruptcy systems on the continent vary signiªcantly, 
but have become far more forgiving in the past decade, following the 
deregulation of consumer credit.235 Consumer credit usage varies 
widely on the continent, with consumers in some countries such as 
Sweden using it heavily, while Italian and Greek consumers use it 
much less frequently.236 Overall, though, credit use is rising and sav-
ings rates on the continent are declining.237 European banking and 
economic ofªcials have expressed concern over this trend.238 As a re-
sult, some have simply stepped up efforts to educate the public about 
the hazards of credit use.239 Others have liberalized bankruptcy and 
discharge laws, in order to ensure that social problems are not exac-
erbated by the increases in credit.240
                                                                                                                      
233Cf. Philip Cullum et al., Entrepreneurship Around the Globe: Adapting to Different Na-
tional Environments, Outlook Point of View (May 2002), at http://www.accenture.com/ 
xdoc/en/ideas/outlook/pov/A4_Global_entrepreneurial_models_PoV2.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2004) (stating that the most important aspect for entrepreneurial executives is the 
particular country’s attitude toward the possibility of failure). 
234 Metzger & Bufford, supra note 4, at 153. 
235 See Kilborn, German Approach supra note 14, at 257; French Law on Consumer Overin-
debtedness, supra note 14, at 5–9. 
236 Eur. Credit Research Inst., Consumer Credit in the European Union (Feb. 
2000), available at http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/gun01/gun01.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 
2004). “The weight of consumer credit is far higher in the U.S. economy than in the EU 
countries, including the UK.” Id. Because of large differences in the use of consumer 
credit observed across EU countries, however, it is hard to generalize about a European 
consumer credit use. Id. 
237 See Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Household Saving Rates - Statistical Data In-
cluded, Economic Outlook, June 2001, at Annex, tbl.26, available at http://www.ªndarti 
cles.com/p/articles/mi_m4456/is_2001_June/ai_78133182 (last visited Dec. 10, 2004). As 
of 2000, France’s national saving rate was 16.1% while Britain’s was 4.7%. Id. The savings 
rates overall appear to be trending down over the long term. 
238 See Heather Stewart et al., Hawkish King Fears High Debt Could Tip UK into Crash, 
Guardian Unlimited, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0%2C3604%2C106 
3043%2C00.html (Oct. 15, 2003) (last visited Dec. 4, 2004). 
239 OFT Issues Consumer Debt Warning, News.BBC.Co.UK, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
1/hi/business/3281871.stm (Nov. 19, 2003) (last visited Dec. 10, 2004). 
240 See Efrat, supra note 15, at 166. Professor Efrat hypothesizes that the need for a 
fresh start policy is greater in societies where the government does not regulate credit 
rates or availability, where the government actively promotes entrepreneurship, where the 
welfare programs are small, and where private ªnancial institutions have relatively lax 
standards for granting credit. See id. at 165–66. He argues that the U.S. fresh start policy is 
very justiªed in this context, and also that more countries should enact more lenient sys-
 
2005] The Role of History & Culture in Bankruptcy & Inslovency Systems 41 
 Not all European countries have forgiving bankruptcy systems, 
however, and some have no systems for consumers at all.241 For exam-
ple, in the bankruptcy-restrictive countries of Italy and Greece,242 in-
dividuals generally are not eligible for bankruptcy protection unless 
they are engaged in business.243 In other words, there is simply no 
bankruptcy system for consumers.244 Even for individuals engaged in 
business, a discharge is not granted until many years after bankruptcy 
is declared, and in a handful of the most restrictive places, no dis-
charge is granted unless creditors are ultimately paid in full.245 This is 
certainly an unusual interpretation of a discharge, at least from a U.S. 
perspective.246 The underlying theme of bankruptcy in these jurisdic-
                                                                                                                      
tems of debt forgiveness as they move toward the United States regarding these factors. See 
id. at 167–68. 
241 See Efrat, supra note 3, at 82–83 (describing how, in Italy and Greece, bankruptcy is 
available only to merchants or businesses). Under one scholar’s characterization of Conti-
nental systems, the most restrictive or “conservative” camp is comprised of systems that 
provide no debt forgiveness to consumers at all. Id. The “moderate” camp is comprised of 
nations that offer debt forgiveness to ªnancially distressed consumers, but not as a matter 
of course, and the least restrictive or “liberal” camp, headed by the United States, consists 
of countries that provide a relatively prompt bankruptcy discharge as a matter of course. 
See id. at 84–87. 
242 Remarkably, the Greeks use little credit. Greek Economy-Weekly Review, Athens News 
Agency, Mar. 15, 2003, available at http://www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/2003/03-03-15. 
ana.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2004). 
243 See Efrat, supra note 3, at 82–83; see also Metzger & Bufford, supra note 4, at 154; 
Hon. Richard L. Bohanon & William C. Plouffe, Jr., Mongolian Bankruptcy Law: A Compara-
tive Analysis with the American Bankruptcy System, 7 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 1, 6 (1999); 
Kevin P. Block, Ukranian Bankruptcy Law, 20 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 97, 99 (1997). 
244 In a few of these places, such as Brazil and Venezuela, an individual is only eligible 
for bankruptcy if he or she is engaged in business activity as a merchant. In many of these 
places there is also little consumer debt available. Perhaps these laws make sense in their 
context. See Antonio Mendes, A Brief Incursion into Bankruptcy and the Enforcement of Creditor’s 
Rights in Brazil, 16 NW. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 107, 111 (1995); Efrat, supra note 3, at 84. In the 
Czech Republic, the debtor must enter into a settlement agreement with her creditors. See 
Helmut Gerlach, Bankruptcy in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland and Section 304 of the 
United States Bankruptcy Code, Proceedings Ancillary to Foreign Bankruptcy Proceedings, 22 Md. J. 
Int’l L. & Trade 81, 93 (1998). Conversely, Chile and Egypt offer the debtor no discharge 
at the conclusion of the proceedings. See Ricardo Sandoval, Chilean Legislation and Cross- 
Border Insolvency, 33 Tex. Int’l L. J. 575, 577 (1998). 
245 See Efrat, supra note 3, at 84–85. Professor Efrat notes that, in these conservative na-
tions, bankruptcy is a creditor-biased mechanism, more akin to a debt-collection proceed-
ing that a debt-forgiveness framework. Thus, there is no need to discharge the debt. See id. 
at 84. In Italy, for example, discharge is for merchants only and it takes ªve years to get a 
discharge, while it takes ten years in Greece. See also White & Chase LLP, supra note 146, 
at 335. 
246 The U.S. Bankruptcy Code of 1978 allows certain debts to be wholly or partially dis-
charged. 
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tions is that bankruptcy is a creditor-oriented mechanism and is not 
designed to serve the interests of ªnancially distressed consumers.247
 The lack of such a system could have grave societal implications 
in the face of consumer credit deregulation. In the past, countries 
without a personal bankruptcy system generally did not have access to 
consumer credit. This equilibrium is now out of balance. Where there 
is an economy with consumer credit, such as in Italy, there is simply 
no way out.248 If one gets in trouble with consumer debt, one remains 
in trouble, perhaps indeªnitely. 
 Other European countries are more forgiving and provide some 
form of discharge. In Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Austria, Ger-
many, France, Spain, and Portugal,249 the judge has the discretion to 
decide whether a discharge is justiªed.250 While the particular standard 
for granting a discharge varies from place to place, the burden is on the 
debtor to prove that the discharge is justiªed in moderate camp juris-
dictions.251 In many places, the judge may grant a bankruptcy discharge 
only if the person is unable to pay the debts.252 For example, in Den-
mark, the debtor must be hopelessly indebted and the circumstances 
must justify granting a discharge.253 In Norway, a debtor must be per-
manently unable to pay.254 In Sweden, in order to get a full or partial 
                                                                                                                      
247 See Efrat, supra note 3, at 82–83. For example, one source claims that the purpose of 
Italian bankruptcy law is to satisfy the creditors’ rights and remove the insolvency company 
from the market. See Giorgio Cherubini, Recognition of an Insolvency Scheme of 
Arrangement in Italy 41, available at http://www.insol-europe.org/publications/cva_ 
italy.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2004). 
248 See Efrat, supra note 3, at 81. 
249 See id. at 85–86. This category also includes the Asian countries of India, Pakistan, 
Japan, Singapore, and the Philippines, as well as Israel, South Africa, Kenya, and Uganda. 
See id. 
250 See id. at 84. This attribute has a fundamental impact on debtors seeking relief, as 
they have the burden of convincing the judge to grant relief. Efrat reports that there are 
three basic reasons why debtors in this strata choose not to ªle for bankruptcy: social 
stigma, ignorance of debt forgiveness outcome, and the high costs and unpredictable re-
sults associated with convincing a judge. Id. at 86–87. This is an attribute of Indian law as 
well as the law of the Philippines, Singapore and Japan, and the African nations listed 
above. See id. at 85–86. 
251 See id. at 84. 
252 See id. at 86. 
253 See Efrat, supra note 3, at 85; see also Hans Petter Graver, Consumer Bankruptcy: A 
Right or a Privilege? The Role of the Courts in Establishing Moral Standards of Economic Conduct, 
20 J. Consumer Pol’y 161, 170 (1997). 
254 See Efrat, supra note 3, at 85. 
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discharge, the debtor must afªrmatively prove that “the debtor has no 
hopes of paying his or her debts in the foreseeable future.”255
 Most European laws grant a discharge of indebtedness only after 
a repayment plan, similar in some respects to Chapter 13 under U.S. 
law.256 In Germany, for example, the debtor must make an effort to 
increase his or her income for the beneªt of creditors,257 and also 
must pay over all seizable income to creditors for six years.258 More-
over, creditors receive all of the debtor’s income over a certain 
amount, a provision that arguably creates the wrong incentives.259
 In all the systems discussed in this Section, there has been move-
ment toward liberalizing the laws, though none are as forgiving as that 
of the United States, England, and the other common law systems.260 
Until recently, it was not clear that the continent needed forgiving 
bankruptcy systems, given its extensive social systems and fairly rigid 
requirements for borrowing.261 But, extensive growth in consumer 
credit makes such debt forgiveness necessary, particularly in light of 
existing stigma about ªnancial failure.262 Fortunately, as a whole, Euro-
pean governments seem interested in making sound public policy to 
protect citizens, and not merely to fuel economies for their own sake.263 
                                                                                                                      
255 See Graver, supra note 253, at 170; see generally Consumer Law in the Global 
Economy: National and International Dimensions 287 (Iain Ramsey ed., 1997) (pre-
senting essays on bankruptcy law in foreign states). 
256 See Efrat, supra note 3, at 88; see also Christoph G. Paulus, The New German Insolvency 
Code, 33 Tex. Int’l L. J. 141, 143–44 (1998). Contra Kilborn, German Approach, supra note 
14, at 279. 
257 See Kilborn, German Approach, supra note 14, at 280–81 (noting that a debtor cannot 
turn down employment and must work in a job outside the person’s ªeld if that is all that 
is available). 
258 See Paulus, supra note 256, at 144. 
The Gesamtvollstreckungsordnung includes a discharge rule—not the Anglo-
American rule but the Swiss rule: It keeps the creditors away only as long as 
the debtor does not achieve a certain income and wealth level. . . . After the 
closing of the [bankruptcy] procedure, the debtor will have to earn as much 
as possible for seven years and hand over this income to a trustee, who will di-
vide it among creditors. 
Id. at 143–44. 
259 The debtor can keep 100% of the ªrst $17,000 in income. See Kilborn, German Ap-
proach, supra note 14, at 286. After that, income is shared but the debtor can never keep 
more than about $27,500 per year. Id. 
260 Martin, supra note 16, at 75. 
261 See Efrat, supra note 3, at 96. 
262 See Kilborn, German Approach, supra note 14, at 260–61; See Kilborn, French Law on 
Consumer Overindebtedness, supra note 14, at 5–9. 
263 See Kilborn, German Approach, supra note 14, at 260–61; See Kilborn, French Law on 
Consumer Overindebtedness, supra note 14, at 5–9. 
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Hopefully these concerns will keep credit from proliferating beyond 
the respective systems’ ability to address failure in a constructive way. 
Some countries, such as Italy, have not yet balanced these concerns and 
may face social problems as a result.264
 Scholar Jason Kilborn, who has studied and translated the new 
personal bankruptcy systems of France and Germany, has noted the 
deep resentment and distrust held by French and German citizens 
toward lenient consumer bankruptcy laws.265 While these attitudes will 
surely change over time, they reºect long-standing notions of immor-
ality and personal responsibility,266 as well as different credit practices, 
both of which bear heavily on the acceptance of, and need for, con-
sumer bankruptcy.267
2. European Reorganization Schemes: France and Germany as 
Examples 
 As with personal bankruptcy systems, not all continental coun-
tries have reorganization schemes. In fact, until recently, most coun-
tries did not have such a scheme.268 With the fall of communism and 
Europe’s desire to create a more competitive market economy, how-
ever, reorganization laws have become popular new legislation. Most 
of these systems are still very different from the U.S. Chapter 11 
model.269 In most places, there is no “automatic stay” that protects the 
                                                                                                                      
264 See Efrat, supra note 3, at 82–83. 
265 See Kilborn, German Approach, supra note 14, at 269. In a 1986 report regarding per-
sonal indebtedness, legislators acknowledged the need for a consumer bankruptcy dis-
charge, but concluded that “a discharge after the Ango-American model is out of the ques-
tion.” Id. In discussing French attitudes, Professor Kilborn notes that the French word for 
business bankruptcy comes from the French word—faillite or the Latin word—fallere, which 
mean to cheat, deceive, or trick. Kilborn, French Law on Consumer Overindebtedness, supra 
note 14, at 1. The even more distrusted consumer bankruptcy process, a recent enactment 
in any event, was called a deconªture, meaning to “diminish by boiling down, or to squan-
der.” Id. 
266 When I say “personal responsibility,” I do not mean the notion that is ºoating 
around in the U.S. Congress today, namely that bankruptcy is a moral issue and that peo-
ple should not take on more debt than they can afford to repay. See Todd J. Zywicki, The 
Past, Present, and Future of Bankruptcy Law in America, 101 Mich L. Rev. 2016, 2025–27 
(2003). Rather, I refer to the notion of whether society is already meeting one’s needs, 
through national health care, good beneªts for the poor and unemployed, and so on. 
267 Kilborn, French Law on Consumer Overindebtedness, supra note 14, at 5–9; Kilborn, 
German Approach, supra note 14, at 260–61. In each of these articles, Professor Kilborn 
chronicles the rise in consumer credit, as well as the resulting need for better personal 
bankruptcy protection. 
268 See Martin, supra note 179, at 78. 
269 See id. 
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debtor and its assets upon the ªling.270 Additionally, in most places 
the debtor must be insolvent in order to apply for reorganization and 
also must have some likely chance of success at reorganizing.271 The 
stay, if there is one at all, normally kicks in after the court sorts out all 
of these problems and issues an order declaring the company in bank-
ruptcy or reorganization.272
 Under most schemes, the debtor’s management is replaced with 
a neutral third party trustee, who will run the company while it is at-
tempting to restructure and control the case and plan proposal proc-
ess.273 In some reorganization schemes, secured creditors are not pre-
cluded or stayed from gaining possession of their collateral, and thus 
can thwart the reorganization process if they wish.274 For example, in 
the new EU Council Regulation of Insolvency Proceedings (IPR), the 
secured party retains the right to dispose of assets and obtain satisfac-
                                                                                                                      
270 See id. 
271 See id. 
272 See id. at 82. 
273 See, e.g., infra notes 277–308 and infra notes 402–430 and accompanying text. 
274 Because of this, some scholars consider these composition systems rather than re-
organization systems. Two economists recently completed a study of bankruptcy and insol-
vency laws and infrastructures around the world. See Clas Wihlborg & Shubhashis Gangop-
adhyay, Infrastructure Requirements in the Area of Bankruptcy Law, in Brookings-Wharton 
Papers on Financial Services 281 (Robert E. Litan & Richard Herring eds., 2001). Posit-
ing that strong creditor remedies, as well as strong rehabilitation systems, should save more 
ªrms, they compared countries on several considerations, starting with whether a county’s 
laws could be considered more debtor friendly or more creditor friendly. See id. at 291. 
Their study actually purports to be much broader, studying the economic role of insol-
vency procedures and their affect on efªcient allocation of resources, economic growth, 
and the depth and duration of ªnancial strain. See id. at 284. They deªned a creditor ori-
entation as one that recognizes the claims of creditors to a great extent in insolvency, see id. 
at 295, and a debtor orientation as one that allows debtors to retain a stake or control in 
insolvency, see id. at 293, although no equity is left in the ªrm. See id. at 291. They also rated 
each country or region’s attitudes toward security, particularly ºoating liens that create a 
security interest in all cash ºow generated by a business, and examined the scope of secu-
rity interests under various countries’ laws. See id. at 294–95. They argued that countries 
that allow ºoating liens or charges and that position the secured creditor’s interests over 
unsecured claims of labor and the government, for example, should create more certainty 
for lenders and thus promote lending and growth. See id. at 295, 307. The authors note 
that, in Latin America, labor claimants are highly favored, which could explain why there 
is little lending in Latin America. On the other hand, the authors acknowledge that the 
same favoritism toward labor is present in France, see id. at 301, but there is no dearth of 
lending there. 
Countries found to be very sympathetic to creditor interests in these ways were all the 
English common-law countries, including the United States, and Scandinavia. See id. at 
296–97. Sympathetic countries include Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, Scot-
land and South Africa. Countries hostile to security on these factors include Belgium, 
Luxemburg, Greece, Spain, and most of Latin America. See id. at 300. 
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tion from the proceeds of those assets.275 Indeed, in some countries, 
labor claims are so strong that they also are not stayed and can veto 
any plan the debtor proposes as well.276
 Many schemes, like the U.S. scheme, provide that creditors can 
vote on the plan of reorganization and thus decide if the business 
should be allowed to reorganize or should instead be liquidated.277 
Many, though not all, countries’ laws also allow the majority to bind 
the dissenting minority to the terms of the plan.278 In some places, big 
institutional creditors, such as lenders and banks, control the case and 
essentially decide the business’s fate.279 In most places, secured credi-
tor claims are not changed in either amount or payment terms, caus-
ing one scholar to conclude that these are not really Chapter 11-style 
reorganization schemes, but rather “composition” plans.280
 Compared to U.S. bankruptcy laws, many countries’ laws read 
like penal codes. Fraud and criminal activities are discussed at length, 
leaving one to believe that there is almost a presumption of criminal 
activity or fraud when a business fails to pay its debts.281 Other provi-
sions suggest that limited liability is not as limited as it is in the United 
States; thus, more debts pass through to parents, owners, and even 
mangers.282 Finally, in some countries, if the managers let the com-
pany run for longer than is reasonable without seeking rehabilitation 
assistance or closing down, the mangers can be imprisoned for wast-
ing creditors’ assets.283
 French reorganization law, at one end of the continuum, is con-
sidered the most rescue-oriented in the world, even more so than 
Chapter 11.284 The goal of the French system is not merely to facilitate 
                                                                                                                      
275 See Dr. Wolfgang Lueke, The New European Law on International Insolvencies: A German 
Perspective, 17 Bankr. Dev. J. 369, 369 n.1 (2001). 
276 See id. Lueke states that, with respect to secured interest, in cases opened under the 
IPR, the IPR provides that “[s]uch a right will not be affected by the opening of the pro-
ceeding.” Id. at 386–87. 
277 See Martin, supra note 179, at 80. 
278 See id. at 82. 
279 See Curtis J. Milhaupt, On the (Fleeting) Existence of the Main Bank System and Other 
Japanese Economic Institutions, 27 Law & Soc. Inquiry 425, 431–33 (2002). 
280 See Martin, supra note 179, at 81. 
281 See id. 
282 See Paulus, supra note 256, at 145. 
283 See id. at 147. 
284 See Wihlborg & Gangopadhyay, supra note 274, at 293. Part of the reason it is con-
sidered more debtor friendly than U.S. law is because of the very strong rights of secured 
creditors under U.S. law, which are balanced by Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 bankruptcies. 
Secured creditors do not have these strong rights in France. Id. at 296. In fact, French 
bankruptcy laws could be considered hostile to secured creditors. 
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reorganization, but to encourage it, through early interventionist 
mechanisms that force or strongly encourage businesses to seek reha-
bilitation early enough that businesses and jobs are not lost.285 France 
has a strong history of state intervention into corporate affairs, which 
has carried over into modern reorganization laws.286 This process fa-
vors saving job-generating enterprises at almost any cost.287
 German reorganization law lies at the other end of the spectrum 
in some respects. It now allows for, but certainly does not favor, the 
use of a debtor-in-possession. In 1999, Germany enacted rescue legis-
lation, with the stated purpose of promoting reorganization over liq-
uidation.288 Prior to this time, the only insolvency law used in Ger-
                                                                                                                      
285 See Richard L. Koral & Marie-Christine Sordino, The New Bankruptcy Reorganization 
Law in France: Ten Years Later, 70 Am. Bankr. L.J. 437 (1996). The laws require greater 
ªnancial reporting so that companies in distress are identiªed early, and the companies 
themselves recognize when they are in need of assistance. All ªnancial reports are ªled 
with the clerk of the Commerce Tribunal who, using computer programs designed to 
identify signs of weakness in a company, brings defaults to the attention of the president of 
the Commercial Tribunal. If the company does not address the defaults, the president of 
the Commerce Tribunal has the power to call the company’s President into chambers for a 
“frank personal discussion.” I can imagine that companies would prefer to avoid this dis-
cussion. Courts in the United States do not have the oversight ability given to the courts in 
France, and hence no early intervention. See id. at 446. The court can also arrange for 
mediation between the company and its creditors before judicial remedies are needed. See 
id. 
286 See id. at 444. France has historically protected the rights of workers, which explains 
the involvement of the court in reorganization plans. Dating back to 1673 with the “Ordi-
nance de Colbert” and the original Commercial Code of 1807, France has had an attrac-
tion for state intervention. The courts play a role much more inclined to protect the eco-
nomic function of society, rather than a means for creditors to regain their debt. 
287 See id. 
288 The new German Insolvency Code explicitly states, in section 1, that one of the 
Code’s objectives is the reorganization of insolvent debtors. See Christoph G. Paulus, Ger-
many: Lessons to Learn from the Implementation of a New Insolvency Code, 17 Conn. J. Int’l L. 
89, 89–91 (citing the Insolvenzordnung [Insolvency Act], v. 5.10.1994 (BGB1. I S.2866), 
Section 1 [hereinafter “InsO”]) (2001). 
Before we get too excited about this signiªcant change, we should recognize that this 
does not mean reorganization in the U.S. sense of staying in business. Section 156(1) of 
the InsO states that “ [a]t the report meeting the insolvency administrator shall report on 
the economic situation of the debtor and its causes. He shall assess any prospect of main-
taining the debtor’s enterprise as a whole or in part, indicate any possibility of drawing up 
an insolvency plan and describe the effects of each solution on the satisfaction of the 
creditors.” See Paulus, supra note 256, at 148 n.49 (citing InsO, Section 156(1)). Section 
157, however, states that “[a]t the report meeting the creditors’ assembly shall decide 
whether the debtor’s enterprise should be closed down or temporarily continued.” See id. 
at 148 n.50 (citing InsO, Section 157). Thus, a reorganization that leaves the debtors op-
erations intact over the long haul seems outside the contemplation of this new law. 
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many was a liquidation statute, the Konkursordnung.289 While another 
prior law, the Vergleichsordnung, allowed rehabilitation,290 the concept 
of reorganizing rather than liquidating a troubled business had never 
really been accepted in German culture and thus the Vergleichsordnung 
was never used.291 Thus, prior to the adoption of the new German 
Insolvency Code (InsO), all businesses were simply liquidated.292
 German lawmakers, if not German society in general, now believe 
that liquidation is not the best solution to some industry or business 
problems.293 The enactment of the InsO was motivated by recessions 
and general problems with the economy, as well as the need to help 
acclimate and protect Eastern European individuals and businesses, 
who had been “overwhelmed by Western consumer standards.”294 
Unlike most parts of the world, German insolvency cases are presided 
over by a specialized bankruptcy court.295 In most cases brought under 
the InsO, a trustee, called an administrator, operates the debtor’s busi-
ness, although at least in theory, a debtor-in-possession is possible.296
 Reality may operate quite differently, however. Whatever the new 
Code actually says about the plan’s possible affect on creditors, credi-
tors—particularly secured creditors—always have and still do control 
insolvency proceedings.297 In fact, although the new Code states that 
the administrator appointed in each case shall be independent and 
thus not biased toward any particular party in the case, prior to the 
                                                                                                                      
289 See Paulus, supra note 256, at 142 (citing Konkursordnung [Bankruptcy Act], v. 
10.2.1877 (RGBI. S.351)). 
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verordnung) [Collective Enforcement Act], v. 6.6.1990 (GBI.DDR I S.285). 
291 See id. at 141–42. 
292 See id. 
293 See Paulus, supra note 256, at 149 n.13 (citing InsO, Section 1). 
294 See id., at 142. Professor Paulus explains in another article that “a few years after the 
wall came down, an enormous and politically signiªcant number of East German house-
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90. 
295 See Broude et al., supra note 6, at 518–19. In fact, many of the important decisions 
made by the German Bankruptcy courts are actually delegated to a graduated law clerk 
who is paid less, and presumably has far less experience, than the judges themselves. See id. 
at 534–35. 
296 See Paulus, supra note 256, at 146–47 (stating that a trustee that is independent of 
the interests of either the debtor or the creditors, is usually appointed in an InsO case for 
the purpose of running the debtor’s business, but that if the creditors still trust the debtor, 
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297 Wihlborg & Gangopadhyay, supra note 274, at 300. 
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enactment of InsO,298 it was common for the administrator to be cho-
sen by the lead or primary secured lender in the case.299 This has not 
changed under the InsO.300 Thus, despite the technical requirement 
of an independent administrator, the main or lead bank can often 
choose an administrator who is friendly to its interests. 
 Additionally, despite clear language in the InsO stating that one 
purpose of the InsO is to “reorganize insolvent debtors,” this concept is 
far from universally accepted. One scholar wrote after the enactment of 
the InsO that German insolvency law does not favor rehabilitation over 
liquidation, and leaves that decision squarely in the hands of credi-
tors.301 Even the explicitly provided-for reorganization contemplated by 
the InsO is not what a U.S. lawyer might picture; this is not a reorgani-
zation in which the business restructures its debts and continues in op-
eration over the long haul. Section 157 of the InsO states that “[a]t the 
report meeting the creditors’ assembly shall decide whether the 
debtor’s enterprise should be closed down or temporarily continued.”302 
Thus, a reorganization that leaves a debtor operational on a long-term 
basis appears outside the contemplation of this new law. 
 Finally, the debtor-in-possession provisions in the InsO are also 
likely to get little play. The concept of a debtor-in-possession has been 
criticized and mistrusted by most of German society for such a long 
time that it may never be unearthed regardless of what the law says.303 
Professor Paulus tells an amazing story about the Holzman Construc-
tion Company bankruptcy, in which Holzman had the most experi-
enced and well thought-of insolvency attorney appointed to the board 
of the company, so that they could go forward under the best of cir-
cumstances with the very ªrst debtor-in-possession case under the new 
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plains, there is no particular reason why these big creditors should not have the right to 
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law.304 The government was so opposed to the concept of a debtor-in-
possession that they found a way to bail Holzman out completely so that 
there would be no bankruptcy and thus no debtor-in-possession.305 After 
this initial stage of rejecting the debtor-in-possession model, German 
companies (including Holzman itself) began to use the debtor-in-
possession model, but it is still the very rare exception to the rule.306
 Again, history and culture may be more important in determining 
how cases are handled than the actual law. As one scholar notes, people 
who were accustomed to the old law are likely to stick to what they have 
become accustomed to and act as they always have, regardless of which 
law is on the books.307 Thus, two years after the InsO went in to effect, 
the new law is still widely objected to, if not ignored.308
3. Conclusions About European Bankruptcy Laws and Culture 
 While one might predict that personal bankruptcy would carry 
more stigma than business bankruptcy in most of continental Europe 
(particularly since some countries do not permit a discharge for peo-
ple who are just consumers), the line between individual ªnancial fail-
ures and business ones is blurred on the continent. Failure is failure, 
pure and simple, and the stigma is signiªcant.309
 Until recently, there was little consumer credit, and thus little 
need for a consumer bankruptcy system. This is all about to change as 
consumer credit becomes widely available to a huge percentage of the 
population over the next decade. This could leave many societies with 
excessive debt and no way to discharge it. Even if discharge systems 
are enacted, societal views about debt may keep them from being 
used. In many failed businesses throughout Europe, including Eng-
land, the stigma is so pronounced that executives, and even employ-
ees and suppliers, often disappear entirely.310
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 On the business side, European governments are already doing 
all that they can to enact rescue-style reorganization systems, in order 
to allow more failing businesses to survive in troubled times.311 As an 
ofªcial EU source stated: 
Europe must re-examine its attitudes toward risk, reward and 
failure. Thus, enterprise policy must encourage policy initia-
tives that reward those who take risks. Europe is often reluctant 
to give a second chance to those entrepreneurs who failed. En-
terprise policy will examine the conditions under which failure 
could acquire a less negative connotation and it could be ac-
ceptable to try again. It will encourage member states to review 
bankruptcy legislation to encourage risk-taking.312
A recent EU study examined stigma and ªnancial failure in the then 
ªfteen EU member states, as well as the United States, to determine 
how to reduce stigma about ªnancial failure, for the beneªt of the 
overall EU economy.313 Given the extent of the negative stigma, the 
study concluded that, even if domestic legislators adopt laws that 
promote a fresh start, “there is a need to introduce a European cul-
tural campaign promoting the fresh start . . . .”314
 Yet Europeans appear conºicted on whether to actually promote a 
fresh start. This study, as well as numerous other sources, focuses exten-
                                                                                                                      
clear that it is failing. In Germany, for example, one can be sent to jail for deliberately and 
recklessly keeping a company in operation once it is losing money. Id. at A3. In other 
countries, there is personal liability to directors and ofªcers of a company that is allowed 
to operate while it is losing money. Needless to say, laws like these do not encourage risk 
taking. 
Tough attitudes toward ªnancial failure make great sense in more socialist societies. 
The government protects people by at least providing the basic necessities of life. These 
basics are provided by taxing private industry enough to keep most people in the middle 
classes. None of this encourages entrepreneurialism nor necessitates a strong debt forgive-
ness system, though it does provide more safety nets than the U.S. system. As the EU em-
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also will be interesting to see if average citizens become more forgiving, both in society 
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311 See White & Chase LLP, supra note 146, at 31. 
312 Id. 
313 See id. According to this study, most EU member states have legal procedures aimed 
at rehabilitation, but they appear to be unsuccessful or unpopular with the business com-
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options, as well as slow adaptation to new systems. Id. at 356. 
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sively on separating the fraudulent from the non-fraudulent debtors, 
and providing rehabilitation rights only for the worthy.315 There is no 
indication, however, that fraud will be a problem.316 While the goals of 
the EU in modernizing and liberalizing the insolvency laws of member 
countries seem sensible, it is unclear whether this will work. Long-held 
and strong cultural values may stand in the way, despite the best inten-
tions of lawmakers. This has clearly been an impediment in Germany, 
where rescue culture has not been accepted in society. In France, by 
comparison, where rescue culture is entirely consistent with long-held 
beliefs about the importance of saving jobs, rescue culture and business 
reorganization has been well accepted and frequently utilized.317
D. East Asian Bankruptcy Law and Culture: A Different World 
 Of all of the East Asian countries, Japan has borrowed the most 
from U.S. bankruptcy systems and also has developed the most com-
plex bankruptcy systems.318 Its systems are thus discussed below in 
some detail. To a large extent, Japan’s attempted transplantations 
have failed to overcome strong cultural attitudes against bank-
ruptcy.319 Hong Kong is less traditional and could probably accept 
modern bankruptcy laws much more readily.320 Ironically, it has not 
modernized its business bankruptcy laws due to its own unique cul-
tural concerns.321 China’s proposed bankruptcy laws also borrow sig-
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supra note 76, at 212. 
317 See supra notes 284–287 and accompanying text. 
318 See infra notes 380–414 and accompanying text. 
319 See infra notes 415–421 and accompanying text. 
320 See infra notes 426–464 and accompanying text. 
321 See infra notes 453–463 and accompanying text. 
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niªcantly from U.S. systems.322 These laws are far more lenient about 
business failure than existing Chinese laws.323 Given China’s tradi-
tionally communist economy, it faces unique challenges as it attempts 
to adopt bankruptcy laws that will promote a market-based econ-
omy.324 Given strong cultural beliefs that bankruptcy is bad luck and 
will follow a family forever,325 China may face problems similar to 
those of Japan in gaining acceptance of more lenient bankruptcy laws. 
1. Japanese Bankruptcy Law and Culture 
 In the past few years, Japanese spending habits, as well as Japanese 
bankruptcy and insolvency laws, have gradually become more similar to 
their U.S. counterparts.326 Drastic measures have been taken to pro-
mote business rehabilitation in order to aid Japan’s ailing economy.327 
Personal bankruptcy has also become more accessible.328 These are 
necessary developments, given that credit has recently become more 
available to the Japanese, which has in turn increased borrowing.329 Yet 
the Japanese avoid using these initiatives for cultural reasons.330
a. Law and Japanese Culture 
 Western legal notions are unfamiliar to the Japanese mind, heart, 
and soul. Traditional Japanese culture emphasizes the group over the 
individual, similarity over difference.331 Thus, the Japanese feel that it 
is embarrassing and shameful to need to resort to the law.332 In fact, 
the Japanese believe that everyone would be better off if there was no 
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law, and no need for the law.333 Naturally, then, use of the court sys-
tem is viewed as a last resort. Informal mediation and negotiation is 
encouraged and used primarily for dispute resolution.334 If these tac-
tics fail and formal proceedings are necessary, it is assumed that both 
parties will neither win nor lose.335 The objective of the court system is 
not to declare a winner or loser, but rather to construct a harmonious 
compromise for both parties.336
 Japanese culture has often been referred to as a culture of 
shame.337 This characterization encompasses everything from the ad-
verse attitude toward the need for laws, to suicide over debts, and eco-
nomic failure.338 In the 1990s, a new element was added into the mix 
of Japanese culture. The government and aristocracy began a cam-
paign of kokusaika, meaning the internationalization of Japanese style 
and culture.339 This trend introduced more foreign inºuences into 
Japan than ever before.340 Yet cultural trends of other countries are 
never fully integrated into the cultural fabric of Japan.341 Instead, they 
maintain their foreignness and are even thought of as elite, exotic, 
and cosmopolitan.342
 With the modern trend of globalizing culture and business, Japan 
began in early 2001 to reform its bankruptcy laws. In the past, bank-
ruptcy proceedings in Japan have taken place only after an extensive 
and informal process of conªdential discussions with the court as to 
reorganization without insolvency.343 This included informal contact 
with creditors.344 The emphasis of these informal discussions was on 
rescue, not through any “formal legal process . . . [or] the application 
of an insolvency law.”345 Unfortunately for the individual or individuals 
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at the head of a ªnancially troubled business, the culture of shame that 
pervades Japan makes bankruptcy a personal failure, not a business 
failure.346 This characterization of bankruptcy in Japan often leads to 
tragedy for the individual, be it suicide or isolation from family and 
community.347 Bankruptcy is a type of devastation not unlike “sickness, 
shipwrecks, ªres, painful childbirth, and other vicissitudes.”348
 The reluctance of the Japanese to use the new formal insolvency 
law and their propensity for the more informal discussion is ªrmly 
rooted in the negative Japanese attitude toward law.349 As law and eth-
ics are inseparable to the Japanese, a contract breach or a formal 
bankruptcy proceeding are as personal as character ºaws.350 Rather 
than a legal system of rights and duties, the Japanese follow the con-
cept of giri.351 Giri is loosely translated to mean “a duty or the state of 
a person who is bound to behave in a prescribed way toward a certain 
other person.”352 Giri is not legally enforced, but socially and cultur-
ally enforced as part of personal honor.353 Again, the idea of shame or 
guilt attached to behaving in a way that is contrary to giri builds the 
foundation of law and society in Japan.354 The well-known Japanese 
notion of “losing or saving face” also ºows from the concept of giri.355 
Following giri is thought to be intuitive, not learned, and therefore, 
formal rules of law are resisted by the Japanese as counter-intuitive.356 
Lawyers themselves appear to play a different role in Japan than in 
the West, as the word lawyer in Japanese, bengoshi, translates loosely as 
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mediator rather than litigator.357 The law itself is analogized to a sa-
cred sword—it is displayed but preferably never used.358
b. Japan’s Economy and Spending Habits 
 While some U.S. citizens stereotype the Japanese as proºigate 
spenders,359 in reality the Japanese are among the biggest savers in the 
world.360 Japan’s economy, the second largest in the world, began to fail 
in the early 1990s because of overall business failure that in turn 
threatened the entire banking system.361 This was caused in large part 
because the Japanese traditionally prefer saving over spending and 
have refused to buy commensurate with Japan’s growing economy.362 
The Japanese government begged citizens to spend money to fuel their 
crashing economy.363 Unlike U.S. citizens, who were too happy to 
oblige when asked to do the same after September 11, 2001, the Japa-
nese refused. As a group, they are less willing to spend, particularly in 
tough economic times marked by industry failures and job loss.364
 Like U.S. spending habits discussed previously, these habits were 
created through historical events.365 After World War II, Japan built its 
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economy on standardized mass production.366 This was wildly success-
ful, creating a large trade surplus with the United States, the world’s 
largest consumer, and creating a large middle class.367 Japan’s success 
in this area caused it to enter the stock or “value” market very late, 
and probably to enter this area too quickly, without public under-
standing or support of the ªnancial industries upon which the value 
market is based.368 This created a bubble economy369 which burst in 
the 1990s, and the effects of which are still felt today.370
 This trend may be changing, however, particularly in the area of 
credit card use. The Japanese currently carry much more cash than 
U.S. citizens and do not use credit cards nearly as extensively.371 Addi-
tionally, while about half of all U.S. citizens carry a balance on their 
credit cards, only about 10% of the Japanese do so.372 This is in part 
because most Japanese cards are not set up for this type of use. In 
most cases, the Japanese are required to decide at the checkout 
counter if they want to pay off the item in one billing cycle or carry 
the debt for a longer period.373 Recently, a new product was made 
available to the Japanese that did not require this up-front decision 
and disclosure, and thus allowed the customer to decide later if he or 
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she wanted to pay off the item or carry it as a balance.374 This ªnan-
cial product has been very successful for the issuers because a shock-
ing 90% of the items purchased on these cards have not been paid off 
in a cycle, but instead carried as revolving credit.375 At least one 
scholar predicts that the use of revolving credit is likely to increase 
drastically as a result of the availability of this product.376
 Despite the past unwillingness of individuals to spend, Japanese 
businesses spent and borrowed extensively. Due to the lack of proªts, 
and extremely lax banking regulations and borrowing requirements, 
many businesses are failing. After a record number of corporate bank-
ruptcies,377 in 1996, the government embraced rescue culture with a 
vengeance, starting a rapid initiative to revamp business reorganization 
laws to make it easier to reorganize and keep a company from fold-
ing.378 The government planned to unfold a new reorganization law for 
smaller businesses in 2001, but as the economy continued to ºag, it 
stepped up efforts and actually ªnalized and passed the new reorgani-
zation law ahead of schedule.379
E. Personal Bankruptcy in Japan 
 As in many other parts of the world, bankruptcy was not initially 
available to individuals in Japan, but only to merchants.380 Eventually, 
a personal bankruptcy system was enacted that could be used by any 
natural person, whether a merchant or not.381 From the beginning, 
creditors in Japan had the right to decide whether to allow a mer-
chant to stay in business or to liquidate his business.382 Today, indi-
viduals are able to obtain a discharge fairly routinely, causing at least 
                                                                                                                      
374 See id. at 1080. 
375 See id. at 1081. 
376 See Mann, supra note 106, at 1081. 
377 See Arthur J. Alexander, Business Failures Rising in Japan as New Bankruptcy Law Takes 
Effect, 22 Japan Econ. Inst. Rep. ( June 9, 2000), at http://www.jei.org/Archive/JEIR00/ 
0022w5.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2004). 
378 See id. The theory behind changing the law was that if these companies could pay 
back their debts, rather than just ceasing operations, this might save the failing banks and 
the entire system. See id. 
379 See id. 
380 Doing Business in Japan § 7.01 (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 2001). The system that was 
in place was simply a private agreement (kashi bunsan) between the obligor and his credi-
tors. See id. The obligor was a social outcast, and not worthy of the usual social considera-
tions due to a member of society. See id. Private agreements began in the 1600s and con-
tinued until 1867. See id. 
381Id. § 7.01[3] (2001); Bankruptcy Act, arts. 5, 12, 31, 33, 34, 42–44, 80–82. 
382 Doing Business in Japan, supra note 380, § 7.01[2] 
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one scholar to conclude that Japanese personal bankruptcy law is not 
drastically different than personal bankruptcy law in the United 
States.383 But, in many ways, Japanese bankruptcy law is stricter than 
U.S. bankruptcy law. A bankruptcy case can be maintained only if the 
debtor is unable to pay debts as they become due.384 Moreover, the 
discharge is not automatic, but must be applied for.385 In addition, it 
takes ten full years to get the discharge, during which time the debtor 
is forbidden from many business activities, including being a director 
of a corporation or a kabushiki kaishi.386
 Personal bankruptcy is rare in Japan, with just 0.7 ªlings per 
1,000 residents in 2000, compared to 5.2 ªlings per 1,000 residents in 
the United States.387 This is not surprising, given the spending habits 
of the Japanese,388 as well as the societal stigma assigned to such be-
havior. The social implications arising out of the bunsan, or customary 
law of insolvency, are clear from the expression chawah hitotsu ni hashi 
ichizen, which literally means “one rice bowl and one pair of chop-
sticks.”389 The phrase refers to the full exemptions to which a debtor 
was entitled under customary law.390 The phrase suggests that a per-
son who has ªled for bankruptcy is entitled to virtually nothing, and is 
                                                                                                                      
383 See Mann, supra note 106, at 1084–85. 
384 See Doing Business in Japan, supra note 380, § 7.02. 
384 Japanese law focuses on the civil law approach of accentuating the debtor’s insolvency 
to justify bankruptcy proceedings. Currently, Japanese law recognizes three bankruptcy 
causes: shiharai-funC (insolvency), shiharai-teishi (suspension of payments), and saimu-chCka 
(liabilities exceed assets). When a petition is ªled with the clerk, the court does not conªrm 
that there is in fact a cause that would support the petition. The obligor can rebut each type 
of cause if they do not want the bankruptcy adjudicated. For a more in depth overview of 
how Japanese Bankruptcy law operates and treats adjudication of Bankruptcy status see Asian 
Development Bank, Insolvency Law Reforms—Report on Japan, at http://www.insolvencyasia. 
com/insolvency_law_regimes/japan/index.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2004); Shinchiro Abe, 
Recent Developments of Insolvency Laws and Cross-Border Practices in the United States and Japan, 10 
Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 47, 49–51 (2002). As in the United States, a trustee is appointed to 
take over all non-exempt assets. See Minhi shikkC HC [Civil Execution Act], Law No. 4 of 
1979), arts. 131, 132, 152, 153, cited in Doing Business in Japan, supra note 380, § 7.06[1]. 
385 See Efrat, supra note 3, at 102. It will be granted, in the judge’s discretion, only if the 
judge ªnds that the debtor is honest and unable to pay his or her debts. See id. Grounds for 
denial of a discharge include fraudulent conveyances prior to the case and making false 
statements to the court. See Minji saisei ho [Civil Rehabilitation Act], Law No. 225 of 1999, 
arts. 366–69. 
386 See Doing Business in Japan, supra note 380, § 7.08[3] n.14. 
387 Efrat, supra note 3, at 100–01. 
388 See Mann, supra note 106, at 1084. 
389 See Doing Business in Japan, supra note 380, § 7.01[2]. 
390 See id. 
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“a disgraced person no longer worthy of the usual social considera-
tion due a member of society.”391
F. Japanese Reorganization Laws 
 Japan has a number of reorganization systems, and they are not 
mutually exclusive.392 This complex system includes the prior Compo-
sition Act,393 the Corporate Reorganization Act,394 and the recently 
enacted Civil Rehabilitation Act (CRA).395 Japan’s Commercial Code 
also provides for an out-of-court workout procedure known as a “Cor-
porate Arrangement.”396 While the Corporate Reorganization Act was 
designed for large publicly traded companies, and while the Composi-
tion Act techinically is the predecessor for the new CRA for small busi-
ness reorganizations,397 a company need not be large to use the Cor-
porate Reorganization Act, nor small to use the CRA.398 In fact, 
Japan’s massive Sogo Department Store recently ªled a case under the 
CRA, probably because it is simply more debtor-friendly and easier to 
use than the Corporate Reorganization Act.399
                                                                                                                      
391 See id. 
392 See Shinichiro Abe, The Japanese Corporate Reorganization Reform Law of 2002, 22 
Amer. Bankr. Inst. J. 36, 36 (2003); Kent Anderson, Small Business Reorganizations: An 
Examination of Japan’s Civil Rehabilitation Act Considering U.S. Policy Implications and Foreign 
Creditors’ Practical Interests, 75 Amer. Bankr. L.J. 355, 360 (2001). 
393 See Abe, supra note 392, at 36 n.6 (citing Wagi ho [Composition Act], Law No. 72 of 
1922 [hereinafter Composition Act]. This was the reorganization law most often used be-
fore the recent enactment of the Civil Rehabilitation Act on Dec. 14, 1999. See Minji saisei 
ho [Civil Rehabilitation Act], Law No. 225 of 1999 [hereinafter Civil Rehabilitation Act]. 
For the statistical ªgures, see Anderson, supra note 392, at 360 (citing 1 Saiko Saibansho 
Jimu Somukyoku [Supreme Court General Secretariat], Shiho Tokei Nenpo, Minji gyosei 
hen (Annual Report of Judicial Statistics, Civil and Administrative Cases Volume)) (1990–
1999). 
394 See Kaisha kosei ho [Corporate Reorganization Act], Law No. 172 of 1952 [herein-
after Corporate Reorganization Act]. The Corporate Reorganization Act has been de-
scribed as a rigid and unforgiving process designed for the rehabilitation of large publicly-
held corporations. See Theodore Eisenberg & Shoichi Tagashira, Should We Abolish Chapter 
11? The Evidence fom Japan, 23 J. Legal Stud. 111, 113–14 (1994). 
395 See Civil Rehabilitation Act, supra note 393. 
396 See Abe, supra note 392, at 36. This is essentially an out-of-court, private workout ar-
rangement. Because it requires the approval of all creditors to the proposed workout plan, 
it is not used much. Id. 
397 See Anderson, supra note 392, at 360–61 (stating that the CRA is best seen as an ex-
tension or revision of the Composition Act). 
398 See id. 
399 See id. at 363–64. The Corporate Reorganization Act had yet to be modernized 
when the CRA was enacted, making the CRA the most recent policy statement about busi-
ness reorganization policy in Japan. See id. 
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 Compared to both the Composition Act and the Corporate Re-
organization Act, the CRA was a radical departure from existing 
law.400 Unlike virtually all other schemes in existence at the time out-
side the United States,401 the CRA does not contain an insolvency re-
quirement.402 Like most other systems, a case will only be accepted if 
there is a chance of reorganization.403
 In theory, the business is run by a debtor-in-possession under the 
CRA.404 The extent to which the company is actually run by a debtor-in-
possession, however, varies from district to district.405 In the Osaka and 
Sapporo districts, courts usually follow a U.S.-style reorganization 
scheme, leaving the debtor-in-possession in place and appointing over-
seers only as an exception.406 In Tokyo, however, courts generally follow 
the old Composition system and appoint a supervisor in every case.407 
In Nagoya, courts seem to follow the English system and appoint exam-
iners, including business professionals, such as accountants, to run the 
                                                                                                                      
400 See id. at 363. 
401 See, e.g., Broude, et al., supra note 6, at 560 (stating that France also has no insol-
vency requirement). 
402 See Civil Rehabilitation Act, art. 21. Now, a mere apprehension of either balance 
sheet or equitable insolvency is sufªcient to allow one to ªle a successful petition. See id. 
The reason for the change was that the drafters wanted to avoid an insolvency requirement 
that could make it too late to rehabilitate. See Anderson, supra note 392, at 367. 
403 See Civil Rehabilitation Act, arts. 21(1), 33. There must be a chance that the plan 
will actually be approved and a showing of good faith. See id. There is a time limit for ªling 
a plan, but it is not a rigid one. See Anderson, supra note 392, at 391. Unlike the Composi-
tion Act, which requires a plan at ªling, “the regulations accompanying the CRA provide 
that, unless special circumstances exist otherwise, a plan should be ªled within two months 
of the deadline for submissions of proof of claim, that claims deadline generally being 
between two and four weeks after commencement.” Civil Rehabilitation Act, arts. 18(1), 84 
(emphasis added). Furthermore, it is the court that determines the time frame for submit-
ting a plan. “Debtor shall prepare and submit to the court a draft rehabilitation plan 
within the period stipulated by the court.” Anderson, supra note 392, at 391 (citing Civil 
Rehabilitation Act, art. 163(1)). 
404 The court, however, has the discretion to appoint a dizzying variety of professionals 
in a case, including supervisors, examiners, trustees, receivers, representative ofªcers, and 
creditors’ committees. See Anderson, supra note 392, at 373–79 (describing the role of each 
of these professionals in detail). 
405 See id. at 373. 
406 See id. 
407 See id. The court can appoint a supervisor to monitor the debtor. The statute is 
vague in terms of the powers of the supervisor, other than that a supervisor will oversee 
the debtor and make sure the debtor does not undertake speciªc acts, as determined by 
the court, without the consent of the supervisor. Civil Rehabilitation Act, art. 54. The su-
pervisor has two afªrmative powers: 1) the court can grant the supervisor a right of avoid-
ance to challenge fraudulent and reªlling transfers, id., art. 56, and 2) the supervisor has a 
subpoena-like right to demand reports directly from the debtor and its ofªcers and man-
agers. Id., art. 59. 
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company in every case.408 Needless to say, there is still ambivalence in 
Japan about the concept of a debtor-in-possession, but this was a tre-
mendous step toward embracing the debtor-in-possession concept. 
 Not long after the CRA was passed, the Corporate Reorganization 
Act was amended to make it more user-friendly as well.409 The most 
radical thing about the new Corporate Reorganization Act is that it 
binds both secured and unsecured creditors.410 Because of a strong be-
lief in betsujo ken, or the right of separation for secured creditors, no 
prior Japanese bankruptcy or insolvency law had ever affected the 
rights of secured parties.411 Even the new CRA does not affect the 
rights of secured creditors,412 though it does allow debtors to reduce 
the debt owed on property by essentially paying its value into the court, 
thus wiping out the secured party’s security interest in that particular 
item.413
                                                                                                                      
408 See id. The powers of the examiner are not as far reaching as those of the supervisor 
in that the examiner does not have the subpoena and avoidance powers. But, the exam-
iner is capable of examining the debtor. Id., art. 62). The major duty of the examiner is to 
provide a report to the court in a stipulated time. Id. 
409 See Abe, supra note 392, at 36. The amendments to the Corporate Reorganization 
Act went into effect on April 1, 2003. Id. 
410 Id. 
411 See Civil Rehabilitation Act, art. 51; Anderson, supra note 392, at 380 n.148. But, the 
CRA does provide that a court can temporarily limit a secured creditor’s right to sell a 
debtor’s property at a judicial sale, if the debtor applies for such an order, pays the credi-
tors potential costs up front, proves that the delay will not hurt the creditor, and also 
proves that the stay of such action is in the best interests of creditors. Civil Rehabilitation 
Act, art. 31(1)(2). 
412The debtor has the burden of proving that the creditor is not entitled to the asset or 
the stay, unlike under Section 362 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, in which the debtor gets 
an automatic stay and the creditor must prove a host of facts in order to get the stay lifted. 
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1), 362(d)(2). The narrowness of this exception demonstrates the 
powers of secured creditors in reorganization cases generally, including cases instituted 
under the CRA. 
413 Civil Rehabilitation Act, art. 148(1). This essentially amounts to a redemption un-
der U.S. bankruptcy law, see 11 U.S.C. § 722, and is always permitted in a Chapter 11 as well 
as a Chapter 7. Unfortunately, most U.S. debtors and, I suspect, Japanese debtors, do not 
have the cash to actually buy out the secured party’s interest in such collateral in most 
cases. While this is not a drastic displacement of the secured party’s rights by U.S. stan-
dards, and probably of little use to a cash-poor debtor, it is the ªrst example in Japanese 
history of reducing a secured party’s claim in a bankruptcy case. See Anderson, supra note 
392, at 384. This provision could be useful in Japan’s current deºationary and stagnant 
economy, where many types of collateral have not held their value. If nothing else, the 
provision may provide leverage—for the ªrst time—against the secured party within a 
bankruptcy case. See id. 
The amendments to the Corporate Reorganization Act made the process far simpler 
overall than it once was. See Abe, supra note 392, at 36 (stating that it was used between 
four and ªfty-seven times per year during the past twenty years). The bankruptcy court 
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 The passage of the CRA, as well as the recent amendments to the 
Corporate Reorganization Act, appear to be a successful attempt at 
liberalizing the law in order to promote rehabilitation. Having said 
that, one would assume that Japanese society now accepts business 
failure as part of life in Japan. This does not appear to be the case. 
Bankruptcy of any kind is still a major embarrassment. The govern-
ment has recently gone so far as to promote the use of the CRA in a 
prime-time television show describing its many positive uses and at-
tributes,414 which itself demonstrates society’s resistance to this idea. 
G. When Law and Culture Clash: Debt and Suicide 
 At a time when the Japanese government is doing everything it 
can to reduce the stigma associated with ªnancial failure, Japanese 
consumers ªnally appear to be loosening up and spending more. The 
use of revolving consumer credit appears to be on the rise, which may 
help fuel the economy. It also may result in more ªnancial failures for 
consumers, which could actually cause more social problems. 
 Despite more consumer credit in the system, the Japanese have 
not relaxed their views on ªnancial failure, for either businesses or con-
sumers. Despite the huge amount of debt companies have taken out 
recently, stigma over a failed business is higher in Japan than virtually 
anywhere else in the world. Executives of failed companies in Japan 
often do more than disappear. Financial failure is the ultimate societal 
disgrace and suicide is a common way out.415 As higher consumer debt 
                                                                                                                      
need not ªnd that a company has a prospect of reorganization under the new Corporate 
Reorganization Act, which is more favorable to debtors than the CRA, and which may fa-
cilitate earlier ªlings. The Corporate Reorganization Act also gives better protection for 
post-petition claims, thus promoting post-petition ªnancing. See id. at 37. Finally, while the 
Corporate Reorganization Act is not a debtor-in-possession system per se, it does allow the 
court to appoint members of the debtor’s management in lieu of a trustee, meaning the 
debtor chief executive ofªcer, its chief ªnancial ofªcer, etc. See id. 
414 Anderson, supra note 392, at 363. It is hard to imagine the U.S. government doing 
such a show to promote the use of Chapter 11, but the Japanese economy is in deep trou-
ble. 
415 Mark West, Dying to Get Out of Debt: Consumer Insolvency Law and Sui-
cide in Japan 14–15 (2003), available at http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/ 
olin/abstracts/discussionpapers/2003/west03015.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2004); see Fran-
coise Kadri, Millions of Ordinary Japanese on Brink of Financial Ruin as Debts Mount, Agence 
Fr.-Press, Mar. 24, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2369590; Yuri Kageyama, Debt, Loan Sharks 
and Culture of Shame a Recipe for Suicide, Japan Times, Mar. 13, 2003, at 15; Marina Kami-
mura, As Japan’s Economy Stumbles, Suicides Near Record Levels, CNN.Com, http://www. 
cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9809/13/japan.suicides (Sept. 13, 1998). Suicide is tied di-
rectly to ªnancial failure, and few people know that they can ªle for bankruptcy instead. 
See Gautaman Bhaskaran, Suicide State, The Hindu, May 12, 2002, available at 2002 WL 
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levels become more common, failures will increase and so may suicide 
rates. It is unclear whether merely liberalizing laws can stem this tide.416
 Japanese culture is complicated, with many unspoken rules and 
hierarchies.417 People have the expectation of being in the same job 
for life and cannot face job loss without losing face.418 Yet, saving face 
is the ultimate societal necessity. Neither law nor propaganda may be 
capable of changing these views. In most parts of Asia, including Ja-
pan, informal agreements are as enforceable as formal ones, if not 
more so.419 Explicit insolvency laws, like explicit contract laws, and 
explicit corporate and securities laws, play a far smaller role than 
those in the Western world.420 Informal insolvency procedures are 
often preferred to formal systems because the formal rules often con-
ºict with the value systems of the society.421 Thus, simply changing the 
laws will not necessarily change ªnancial and legal practices, or atti-
tudes toward ªnancial failure. 
                                                                                                                      
20190290. There are scores of newspaper articles reporting on this problem, although this 
story is among the most poignant. It ties the high suicide rates directly to the economic 
slump and outlines the government’s attempts to alleviate the problem through education. 
The article reports on Japan’s well-known tradition of life-time employment and company 
loyalty, as well as the trend toward suicide when job loss occurs. Japan’s suicide rate is the 
highest in the industrial world, over 80 per day. This source attributes a large portion of 
such deaths to ªnancial problems, a phenomenon unknown to U.S. society. See id. 
416 Stigma can be explained by looking at psychological literature that claims that, the 
more a society values independence, the less worried it is likely to be about contract 
breaches in general, and failures to pay speciªcally. Cultures that highly value dependence 
over independence are more likely to want to keep their word at all costs as a way of saving 
face. Davangshu Datta, Uncertain Times, The BS Weekend, October 26, 2002, available at 
2002 WL 100052313. 
417 Milhaupt, supra note 279, at 434–35. 
418 See Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Relational Theory of Japanese Corporate Governance: Contract, 
Culture, and the Law, 37 Harv. Int’l. L. J. 3, 4 (1996). 
419 See id. 
420 See id. 
421 See Wihlborg & Gangopadhyay, supra note 274, at 305. For example, in Indonesia 
and Thailand, new restructuring laws and procedures were implemented after the Asian 
crisis. See id. at 306. These new changes have had virtually no effect in assisting viable com-
panies to restructure or in closing down nonviable ªrms, because there is a deep-rooted 
belief that creditors should not be able to take over ªrms that owner-managers have built 
up over time. Id. This obviously creates no incentives for ªrms to attempt to improve their 
businesses as there is no way for a creditor to effectively foreclose on assets and no threat 
of take-over. 
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1. Lesson from Hong Kong and China 
 Neither Hong Kong nor China has developed bankruptcy systems 
as elaborate as the Japanese bankruptcy laws.422 Hong Kong has a mod-
ern individual bankruptcy law, but does not have a business reorganiza-
tion system.423 China has no personal bankruptcy system, but is devel-
oping a rescue system for ailing businesses.424 As is the case in Japan, 
cultural issues may keep the Chinese from using these new laws.425
a. Hong Kong Bankruptcy Law and Culture 
 As one would expect from an English colony, Hong Kong’s insol-
vency laws have always looked somewhat similar to those of Eng-
land.426 What is harder to anticipate is that Hong Kong still has no 
corporate reorganization process, and has taken few steps to modern-
ize its business bankruptcy laws. Hong Kong’s current insolvency laws 
are based loosely on law from England that dates back to 1929.427 Not 
surprisingly, these laws are archaic, harsh, and pro-creditor.428
 Proposed changes to the Hong Kong insolvency laws dealing with 
corporate or business reorganization have failed to pass.429 Liquida-
tion, which is referred to as “insolvency,” is the only option for corpo-
rations.430 For almost a decade, scholars and legislators have been at-
tempting to pass a corporate rescue regime in Hong Kong, but to no 
avail.431 The scheme, named “provisional supervision,” was originally 
drafted to operate much like an English “Administration.” Under a 
                                                                                                                      
422 See infra notes 423–510 and accompanying text. Thus, there is much less to say 
about the bankruptcy laws of Hong Kong and China; see also Roman Tomasic et al., Insol-
vency Law Administration and Culture in Six Asian Legal Systems, 6 Austl. J. Corp. L. 248, 248 
(1996) (noting that the Hong Kong and Chinese laws in place are old and their purpose is 
to kill the company, not revive it). 
423 Leslie Burton, An Overview of Insolvency Proceedings in Asia, 6 Ann. Surv. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 113, 114-15 (2000). 
424 See Tomasic et al., supra note 422, at 252 (stating that China has no personal bank-
ruptcy system). China is also developing a consumer culture. The Knight Ridder news 
service ran a recent story about Mercedes dealerships and Gucci stores popping up all over 
China. Tim Johnson, China: Asia’s New Money Machine, Albuquerque. J., Feb. 15, 2004, at 
B8. 
425 See infra note 484–493 and accompanying text. 
426 See Burton, supra note 423, at 114. 
427 Tomasic et al., supra note 422, at 255. 
428 Burton, supra note 423, at 114. 
429 Id. at 115; See Philip Smart & Charles D. Booth, Corporate Rescue: Hong Kong Develop-
ments, 10 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 41, 42 (2002). 
430 See Burton, supra note 423, at 114–15. 
431 See id. at 115. 
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provisional supervision, a specialist or trustee runs the company and 
proposes a voluntary arrangement, that creditors vote upon within six 
months.432 As in an English Administration, creditors control the pro-
ceeding.433 None of the drafts of the yet-to-be-passed provisional su-
pervision contemplate a debtor-in-possession system.434
 The ªrst drafts of the new procedure were vehemently opposed 
by labor groups, who currently receive the ªrst dollars out of a liqui-
dating company under the liquidation procedure set out in section 
166 of the Companies Ordinance.435 These groups feared that the 
new provisional supervision would be less favorable to their interest 
and thus opposed the bill.436 Thereafter, in order to appease these 
interests, the draft law was changed to require any company in provi-
sional supervision to pay off in full, in advance, all wage claims and 
severance payments for all workers laid off in the past, or to be laid off 
in the future, in the context of the reorganization.437 Many scholars 
and legislators see this requirement, which is still contained in the 
current proposed draft bill, as a major obstacle to successful rehabili-
tation, or even attempted rehabilitation.438
 Another sticking point in the current legislation has been the 
treatment of secured creditors. In earlier drafts, secured creditors voted 
with all other creditors on the arrangement, and thus could be forced 
                                                                                                                      
432 Charles D. Booth, Hong Kong Corporate Rescue: Recent Developments, 15 Am. Bankr. 
Inst. L. Rev. 24, 24 (Nov. 2000). Interestingly, the bill provided that provisional supervi-
sion be available to both insolvent and solvent companies. Id. 
433 See id. 
434 See id. 
435 See Philip Smart & Charles D. Booth, Provisional Supervision and Workers’ Wages: An 
Alternative Proposal, 31 HKLJ 188, 188 (2001). 
436 Id. 
437 Smart & Booth, supra note 429, at 43. The law actually requires such companies to 
“pay off in full (or set up a trust account with a licensed bank containing sufªcient funds 
to pay off in full): (a) all wage claims owed to its employees; and (b) all entitlements aris-
ing under the Employee Ordinance (e.g. severance payments) owed to its ‘former em-
ployees.’” Id. Because the words “former employees” are interpreted narrowly, this requires 
companies to not only set aside the funds for those already laid off, but also to calculate 
and pay in advance the same amounts for workers that will be laid off in the restructuring 
effort. Id. 
438 Electronic Interview with Charles D. Booth, Associate Dean, University of Hong 
Kong (Dec. 2, 2004). In compulsory liquidations, the workers’ main protection comes 
from what is called the “protection of wages on insolvency fund.” A possible solution to the 
current impasse, proposed by the Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury in 
September of 2002, is to require that in a provisional supervision, companies be required 
to pay up front (or deposit in a trust account) an amount equivalent to the amount that 
would be payable by this fund in a compulsory liquidation, rather than to pay the entire 
amount of all entitlements in full. Id.
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to accept a plan they did not like, and could lose the beneªt of their 
superior position in their collateral.439 While the current draft no 
longer contains these disadvantageous provisions, the pendulum may 
now have shifted too far in the secured creditor’s favor.440 Secured 
creditors holding a security interest in all, or substantially all, of a 
debtor’s assets now have veto power over the provisional supervision 
and can, for four to seven working days following a petition, terminate 
the provisional supervision completely.441 None of this has become law, 
however, so all provisions are still up for grabs. Moreover, Hong Kong 
has a long history of handling insolvency and ªnancial distress through 
informal means, such as out-of-court workouts, and this trend is likely 
to continue whether the provisional supervision passes or not. 
 While business bankruptcy law in Hong Kong has not been mod-
ernized, the bankruptcy process for individual debtors, which is called 
“bankruptcy,” has been relaxed and modernized.442 In the past, due to 
the discretionary discharge provisions, many debtors received no dis-
charge and the shortest time in which one could obtain a discharge was 
eight years.443 For example, for the ten-year period from 1983 through 
1992, roughly 2,400 people ªled for personal bankruptcy in Hong 
Kong and only twenty-ªve received a bankruptcy discharge.444 In effect, 
the discretionary discharge made bankruptcy a life sentence for 
most.445 During the post-ªling period and before a discharge, a debtor 
cannot obtain additional credit. Effective April 1, 1998, many, if not 
most, individual debtors can obtain a discharge within four years.446
 Unlike in some parts of East Asia, Hong Kong citizens have not 
been afraid to exercise their bankruptcy rights.447 In November of 
2003, there were 939 bankruptcies in the City of Hong Kong.448 There 
                                                                                                                      
439 Id. at 42–43. 
440 See id. 
441 Id. Though exercising this veto power might cause the bank in question to suffer 
bad publicity, the current draft does allow a primary secured creditor to prevent a provi-
sional supervision from happening. Id. at 44. 
442 See Charles D. Booth & Philip St. J. Smart, Retroactive or Prospective?: Determining the 
Scope of Hong Kong’s New Insolvency Law, 8 Int’l Insol. Rev. 27, 32 (1999). 
443 Id. The bill also provided that all bankrupts who were adjudicated bankrupt prior 
to April 1, 1998 would be discharged from bankruptcy on April 1, 1999. See id. 
444 Id. at 32 n.24. 
445 Id. at 32. 
446 See Id. 
447 See Kelvin Chan & Chow Chung-yan, Bankruptcies Fall to Their Lowest Level in Two 
Years, S. China Morning Post, Dec. 20, 2003, at 3. 
448 Id. 
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were 1,417 during October of the same year.449 These numbers show 
that ªlings were down from the prior year, when there were 2,441 in 
November of 2002, and 3,193 in January of 2003.450 These numbers are 
astronomical compared to the ten years prior to this time, showing an 
increase in ªlings of over 1,000%.451 While some of this increase can be 
attributed to liberalization of the individual bankruptcy discharge, in-
creases in consumer credit, particularly credit cards, may also explain 
these increases.452 As of March of 2002, there were nearly 7 million 
residents of Hong Kong, and 9.38 million credit cards in circulation.453
 Culture appears to play a much smaller role in Hong Kong’s atti-
tudes towards bankruptcy, especially compared to China.454 Because 
Hong Kong laws are based on English law, the law lacks local culture 
elements unique to Hong Kong.455 Although there are remnants of 
Chinese ideals in Hong Kong, such as the desire to pay creditors out 
of moral obligation, these Chinese traditions are diminishing due to 
the transient nature of Hong Kong’s population.456 Moreover, most 
bankruptcies in Hong Kong involve foreign companies rather than 
purely Chinese ones. Assets in Hong Kong tend to be people, rather 
than large capital assets, and money goes in and out of Hong Kong 
quickly, requiring quick court action in bankruptcy cases.457
 Not surprisingly, then, ªling for bankruptcy in Hong Kong does 
not carry as much stigma as in many other Asian countries, in part 
because Hong Kong’s community is internationally-oriented and tran-
                                                                                                                      
449 Id. 
450 Id. 
451 Id. As in the United States, there is some indication that ªlings increased after the 
discharge rules were liberalized in 1998, though the entire increase is unlikely to be attrib-
utable to this fact. Id. 
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282. Workers in Hong Kong tend to fall into two attitudinal categories based on their age. 
Those over 50 tend to be tied into Chinese culture and beliefs, and think of business rela-
tionships as long term commitments. Younger workers are often more inºuenced by West-
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sient.458 Some large bankruptcies in the 1980s made the idea more 
common, and therefore more acceptable.459 Among the traditional 
Chinese people who live in Hong Kong, the stigma is still present, and 
bankruptcies from Chinese owned business are rare.460
 Like the mainland Chinese, Hong Kong citizens would rather 
avoid courts, preferring to work things out on their own.461 The robust 
Hong Kong economy also has made bankruptcy reform less of a neces-
sity.462 When businesses do fail, the banks have been willing to bail 
many out. Many people believe, however, that reform is badly needed 
in Hong Kong.463 Moreover, Hong Kong citizens are more likely to em-
brace and to use modern bankruptcy laws than the citizens of either 
China or Japan. Confucianism and other traditional forces play a 
smaller role in modern, long-colonized, market-based Hong Kong.464
b. Chinese Economics, Bankruptcy Law, and Culture 
 Unlike colonized Hong Kong, mainland China has a long history 
of economic and social isolation, and a history reaching as far back as 
221 B.C., the year it gained its independence. 465 China is also one of 
the world’s largest countries by land-mass, and is the world’s most 
populated country with a population of 1,298,847,624.466 In recent 
years, China has undergone a surprising shift from a state controlled 
economy to an economy where a growing percentage of enterprises 
are privately controlled.467 In fact, well over half of all China’s busi-
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nesses are now privately owned.468 Moreover, China is working hard to 
encourage foreign investment in its businesses.469
 In the past, the communist government of China has fought to 
limit any capitalist inºuence in the economy.470 Now, due to a grow-
ing realization that capitalism may produce more efªciently in many 
sectors than the regime’s State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), the Com-
munist Party of China is accepting and even encouraging capital-
ism.471
 This acceptance of private enterprise did not occur suddenly. 
Through the assumption of power of the Communist Party until the 
1980s, the authorities actively crushed capitalist enclaves.472 In 1982, 
the government “rehabilitated” capitalist entrepreneurs in an effort to 
increase economic activity.473 “At the 16th party congress, not only 
were the ‘red capitalists’ invited to join the Communist Party, some 
private entrepreneurs were even made delegates.”474 The Communist 
Party also vowed to “promote the healthy development of the non-
public sector” and to “better safeguard private property.”475
 China’s SOEs are concentrated in heavy industrial operations 
and have incurred large debt loads. These industries have been re-
structured with massive layoffs and corporate restructuring in an at-
tempt to increase efªciency.476 Restructuring efforts are yielding lim-
ited results. Even with the Chinese government’s doubtful ofªcial 
statistics, the SOEs’ losses exceeded proªts for the ªrst time in 
1996.477 Moreover, China’s large state banks have written off US$15.3 
billion in non-performing loans to SOEs.478
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 Private enterprise is developing rapidly despite a difªcult regula-
tory environment and continuing government discrimination.479 By 
2002, the private sector generated around 60% of China’s output 
while using only 20% of the country’s resources. The SOEs produced 
only 40% of output while consuming 80% of resources.480 The private 
sector is producing eight out of ten new jobs.481 China’s overall econ-
omy is growing by 8% and this rate is expected to continue into 
2005.482 The Chinese Communist Party is committed to maintaining 
this growth over the next two decades and the private sector will have 
to play an integral part in this growth.483
 Culture plays a substantial role in Chinese laws, especially its 
bankruptcy laws.484 Considering its population, China has a low level 
of reported commercial bankruptcies.485 In Chinese society the no-
tion of bankruptcy has long been condemned as “bad luck,” meaning 
“broken fortune.”486 If a father owes a debt, his sons or grandsons 
would be responsible for it; bankruptcy implies a life of burden for 
generations to come.487
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 The Chinese historically have a low regard or disbelief in judicial 
power.488 Creditors focus on guanxi (relationships) as opposed to 
their entitlements to payment.489 As is further discussed below, bank-
ruptcy cases in China have been controlled by the government, not by 
independent courts, causing citizens to distrust the system.490 Confu-
cianism also continues to have great inºuence on commercial activi-
ties. Confucian ethical teachings include the following values, which 
are held in high respect by the average Chinese person and are visible 
in Chinese business practices and their use of law: Li, includes “ritual, 
propriety, etiquette, etc.”; Hsiao, “love within the family: love of par-
ents for their children and of children for their parents”; Yi, “right-
eousness”; Xin, “honesty and trustworthiness”; Jen, “benevolence, hu-
maneness towards others, the highest Confucian virtue”; and Chung, 
“loyalty to the state”.491 Confucianism “encourages balance and har-
mony.”492 “Unless there is no other choice, people should keep their 
friendships and relationships intact,” rather than pursue court inter-
vention; under Confucianism, it is also “anti-moral” to force a debtor 
into involuntary bankruptcy.493
 Socialism and communism also have a great affect on attitudes 
and culture in China and the resulting bankruptcy laws.494 The most 
developed and most signiªcant Chinese Bankruptcy laws focus on 
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Chinese government policy is very conservative and will not allow signiªcant 
SOEs to go bankrupt and judges can’t make bankruptcy decisions without 
government approval. In addition, many practitioners agree that “the legal 
system is too raw” and that judges “do not understand the bankruptcy law’ 
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492 Ma, supra note 325, at 206. 
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SOEs.495 It is very difªcult to place an SOE into bankruptcy and gov-
ernment permission is needed.496 SOEs are property of the state, and 
bankruptcy is viewed as a leadership failure, a loss of face for the gov-
ernment.497 Yet, scores of SOEs operate at a loss.498 Naturally, if a 
large number of SOEs were to be closed down at one time, many 
people could simultaneously lose their jobs, and no national provision 
has yet been enacted to address this problem.499 If SOEs are given 
free access to bankruptcy, a domino effect is also feared because many 
SOEs are deeply indebted to one another.500
 Private enterprises are permitted to ªle a liquidation case, which 
can later become a reorganization case, under Chapters 16 and 19 of 
China’s Civil Procedure Law.501 If the case is accepted by the court, 
then a stay of collection efforts goes into effect.502 While all cases begin 
as liquidations, a case can proceed, through the actions of a Creditors 
Assembly, so that creditors can vote on a reorganization plan that will 
be approved if it is accepted by two-thirds of all unsecured creditors.503 
Priority treatment is given to wage claims ªrst, and then to taxes.504
 In 1986, China passed a controversial law that permitted the bank-
ruptcy of SOEs.505 These cases all start as liquidations, but can then be-
come reorganization cases.506 The goals in enacting this new law were 
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to encourage more efªcient management of SOEs and to liquidate un-
proªtable businesses.507 Lawmakers continue to call for reform of this 
law, however, because it leaves the decision about whether a company 
can ªle for bankruptcy in the hands of the government, rather than 
courts or creditors.508 Courts are still not independent, and the com-
munity continues to have a lack of trust for judicial bodies.509 More-
over, despite the clear purpose of the new law, the government still 
views it as a loss of face if an SOE fails, and thus limits access to the new 
system.510 Clearly, the desire to compete in a global capital market can-
not overcome ancient cultural and societal beliefs. 
2. Conclusions About East Asian Bankruptcy Policies and Culture 
 As many traditional societies are learning, changing the law and 
getting people to use the new law, are two very different things. Japan, 
for example, pushed for early passage of its new Civil Rehabilitation 
Law, one of the few debtor-in-possession systems in the world. It was 
enacted ahead of schedule to try to help breathe life into Japan’s 
ºoundering economy. While it has been used to some extent, the 
government would like to see it used much more.511 Shame over debt 
is still prevalent. With more debt in the system, a recessionary econ-
omy, and more business failures, debt-related suicides have been on 
the rise. 512 While Japan’s Economy Minister has called for a change 
in both laws and attitudes about debt repayment, it is far easier to 
change the laws than the attitudes. 
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 As China prepares to approve and unfold its reorganization 
scheme, it may be faced with similar problems. The Chinese also con-
sider it a shameful thing to not pay one’s debts, a misfortune that 
would follow one for the rest of his or her life.513 Culturally, like the 
Japanese, the Chinese are taught to value relationships over money 
and self-promotion. 
 None of the Asian countries discussed have high corporate bank-
ruptcy rates. The reasons are both cultural and opportunity-driven. 
Sometimes the law is not helpful. Much of the time, cultural factors 
make bankruptcy taboo. In China, businesses can continue to hide 
behind state ownership even if they are not proªtable. No one loses 
face. Where this is unavailable, such as in Japan’s capitalist market, 
then suicide is one way out; for some it is preferable to using the new 
laws. Japan and other countries with a strong culture of shame must 
ªnd a way to balance economic goals, such as fueling the economy 
through more and more credit, with the serious ramiªcations of over-
indebtedness. In the end, bankruptcy systems must be drafted to meet 
a country’s cultural, as well as economic, needs. Merely transplanting 
bankruptcy systems from other parts of the world, particularly cultur-
ally dissimilar places, is ineffective. The resulting laws are misunder-
stood, distrusted, and underutilized. 
Conclusion 
 As the above discussion of U.S. policy demonstrates, bankruptcy’s 
fresh start, as well as the reorganization through a debtor-in-possession, 
grew from the roots of U.S. capitalism.514 First came the creation of an 
entrepreneurial economy, followed by an active consumer economy. 515 
The conditions for such a system were present from the beginning of 
the economy, and the bankruptcy systems grew directly from them. 
 Today, other countries are attempting to create more vibrant 
market-based economies, in part by developing new insolvency sys-
tems.516 At the same time, citizens of the world are also being exposed 
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to more and more credit—often more than they can back.517 One 
fairly obvious way to reduce the pain and suffering that could result 
from this new credit economy is to enact lenient discharge and reor-
ganization laws to address the ªnancial failure that will inevitably oc-
cur. This is certainly the global trend.518
 This Article suggests that creating more forgiving insolvency sys-
tems may make economic and social sense, but still may not be ac-
cepted in some societies. On the other hand, attitudes toward bank-
ruptcy in the United States changed once bankruptcy became more 
common, so perhaps long-held cultural views around the world will 
change as well. Only time will tell. In the meantime, governments and 
lawmakers must realize that imported bankruptcy systems are not be-
ing implanted on to blank cultural slates, such as the U.S. economy 
and social system of the 1700s and early 1800s. Many existing cultures 
are far more complicated. To those governments, I suggest the follow-
ing cautious approach to developing new insolvency systems. 
 First, recognizing that new bankruptcy systems take some time to 
be accepted, governments and lawmakers should think very carefully 
and cautiously about how and when to deregulate credit systems. 
They should try to limit available credit to that which citizens can 
handle on their incomes, and not try to assume that extensive credit 
and purchasing power necessarily represents the good life. For a soci-
ety that does not accept debt forgiveness, even if it is legally permissi-
ble, this could be a dangerous trap. The social consequences could 
include losing the family home, other possessions, and even family 
members themselves. 
 Second, assuming that it may be too late to carefully consider 
how credit is regulated, because it already has been extended in 
amounts higher than many can pay, governments and lawmakers 
should try to educate the public about responsible credit use, as well 
as the debt forgiveness beneªts that the law provides. Such education 
is being attempted in both Europe and Japan, although many con-
sumers report that they are unaware of the debt forgiveness now al-
lowed by law. Others still refuse to use these laws because doing so is 
dishonorable.519 Education efforts should continue in an effort to des-
tigmatize, as well as avoid isolation, voluntary exile, and suicide from 
over-indebtedness. 
                                                                                                                      
517 See supra note 2. 
518 See Efrat, supra note 3, at 92–94. 
519 See Business Suicides: Japan’s Death Trap, Bus. Week Online, at http://www.busi 
nessweek.com/print/magazine/content/02_22/b3785141.htm ( June 3, 2002). 
2005] The Role of History & Culture in Bankruptcy & Inslovency Systems 77 
 Finally, governments that are working on new bankruptcy systems 
should avoid the wholesale transplantation of any system, but in par-
ticular, should avoid transplanting U.S. systems without giving thought 
to the individual components of such laws. U.S. debt culture appears to 
be different from that of most of the rest of the world, and more mod-
erate approaches may transplant with greater success. Transplanted 
aspects of U.S. bankruptcy law have been ignored in practice in Ger-
many, Japan, Eastern Europe, Indonesia,520 and Thailand,521 as well as 
other parts of the world. They are simply too confusing, contextual, 
and complicated to make sense in their new homes, and also are based 
on social and cultural assumptions that the new host countries do not 
share.522 This causes more problems than it solves by suggesting that 
the social problems caused by over-indebtedness have been solved 
when they have not. Rather than import any systems wholesale, coun-
tries should attempt to borrow from many systems and ensure that the 
new law reºects both the economic needs of the society, as well as the 
unique cultural components of the society.523
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